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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion chi the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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and European Policy Formation
Introduction
Reflection on European macroeconomic policies appears to be particular­
ly timely for two main reasons: the rapid change in the political context 
and the hesitations concerning the reliability as well as the implications of 
macroeconomic scientific knowledge. In these lectures I shall attempt to 
express my views as a research worker concerned in particular with the 
technical problems of economic policy formation. These views bear on 
the evolution and progress of the macroeconomic discipline as much as on 
the way in which it ought to serve for the determination of proper solu­
tions to present actual problems.
The twcrtsfci.lectures will be respectively devoted to the two main types 
of structural reforms about which Europe has now to take decisions. 
Lecture 3 will consider the choice of the economic system; even quite in­
dependently of the present revolution in Eastern Europe, important ques­
tions are raised on these issues in Western Europe. Lecture 4 will deal 
with the economic challenge of European unification, a challenge that any 
Jean Monnet lecturer should address even if it was not on the policy 
agenda.
Before going frankly into these topics it is appropriate to pause in 
order to understand well where recent trends in macroeconomic research 
and recent experience in policy formation has led us. Lecture 1 then will 
survey this history and attempt to draw significant conclusions from it. 
With the same purpose, lecture 2 will go deeper into both the methodol­
ogy of macroeconomics and the assessment of some crucial features of 
macroeconomic phenomena.
I. Macroeconomic wisdom on policy formation
1. Introduction
The modem concept of economic policy is now roughly fifty years old. 
Concern with unemployment, proposals for expansionary demand man­



























































































sibility to macroeconomic policies in the 1930s. On the other hand the 
basic logical structure to be used in policy formation was made explicit 
and studied by J. Tinbergen (see in particular his two books, 1952 and 
1956). Since those days quite a few relevant questions have been posed 
about the proper way to study the impact of policies, so that Tinbergen’s 
original theory has been much extended and made a great deal more so­
phisticated.
During this half a century macroeconomic knowledge has also evolved. 
While its main elements could be conveyed in 1940 with the bare bones of 
Keynes’ General Theory, we have added much to it, amended the central 
propositions, developed complementary and even alternative theoretical 
structures, gathered a lot of macroeconomic data, processed them by 
thousands of econometric studies. As a result our ideas about the underly­
ing phenomena have become a good deal more subtle and complex.
In order to grasp how the present challenges can best be met it is useful 
to understand this double history. This is why I shall attempt in this lec­
ture to take a bird’s eye view of the events the economic profession has 
been living and to reflect on their implications. What is needed does not 
then cover all the material that would have to be found in a book on the 
history of thoughts, but rather the part of it that may have direct rele­
vance today.
For this purpose the starting point has not to be the immediate pre- or 
post-war years. It will suffice here to consider in section 2 the situation in 
the mid-1960s, when the initial ideas had matured and been diffused, and 
when the institutional and statistical framework for their application had 
been set up. A well defined methodology was then taught and widely ap­
plied; a large part of it remains valid now.
But the methodology was not unanimously praised. Both on the left and 
on the right of the majority, some economists expressed dissatisfaction 
and argued for different conceptions and different strands of economic 
policy. They were occasionally influential, not only on the development 
of ideas but also on actual policy choices. Both of these groups have con­
tributed to the revision of the majority view and are still active these 
days. I shall devote sections 3 and 4 respectively to their messages.
Reflecting on past history is also useful in another respect, namely to 
understand the nature of the interplay between three activities: academic 
research, policy advising and policy deciding. The experience gained in 
this respect during the past decades has obvious significance for anyone 
who cares about the ultimate aims that policies are intended to serve. It 
will be the subject of section 5.
2. Economic policy formation, as seen in the ’60s
Twenty-five years ago a short presentation on macroeconomic policy was 
a simple and pleasant matter, whether the presentation was addressed to 




























































































justified in expressing that this policy could have a good degree of success 
and because one could state a message that seemed to be more and more 
widely accepted by economists. First one had first to explain the objective 
assigned to macroeconomic policy; then one had to sketch a simple theory 
on the working of the economy; and finally one had to outline a method­
ology for a rational choice of a policy. Let us consider these three parts, 
in the spirit in which they were discussed in the ’60s but without refrain­
ing from taking into appropriate account considerations that have been 
stressed more recently.
The objective most often chosen was full employment with stability. 
Full employment meant that anyone able and willing to work, ready to 
move and having reasonable wage and qualification claims could find a 
job after a normal time of search. In other words, unemployment had to 
be only frictional, due both to the presence of search activities and to an 
unavoidable degree of mismatch between the geographical and profes­
sional structures of on the one hand the supply of labor, and on the other 
hand the demand for it. (In these lectures I shall not insist on the fact that 
a margin of appreciation remains in the use of these definitions of full 
employment and frictional unemployment.) Stability referred to prices 
and nominal wage rates. It was hardly ever intended to mean the absence 
of any increase in the general level of prices; but the increase had to be 
small (two or three per cent a year, say) and to be kept under control, ac­
celeration due to unexpected shocks being prevented from becoming per­
manent.
Achievement of both full employment and price stability was not 
claimed to always be easy; but it was at that time considered as likely 
enough to remain feasible. A number of governments and even constitu­
tions did commit policies to meet the two objectives.
Already then and again later on, other objectives were often added. For 
instance the “magic square”, on which national performance was proposed 
to be measured, also considered the rate of growth and the surplus of the 
current balance of payments. Inducing a more equal distribution of in­
come and wealth was also often claimed to be aimed at. In order to rec­
ognize that weights had to be given to these various objectives, it often ap­
peared useful to refer to a welfare function that economic policy should 
maximize. It was even pointed out on occasion that different govern­
ments, appointed by different parts of the electorate, had naturally to 
adopt different welfare functions.
The main determinant of the macroeconomic evolution was then viewed 
as being the aggregate demand for goods and services. A too low level of 
aggregate demand would entail a low output and some non- frictional 
unemployment; a too high level would generate inflationary pressures and 
price increases would accelerate. This functioning of the economy could 
be represented, with a fair degree of accuracy, by an econometric model 
in which each equation would have its own meaning. Some equations 




























































































vestment ...), others the changes in prices and wage rates (Phillips law); 
employment would respond to output as determined by demand (Okun 
law), and so on.
According to this vision of the phenomena, the supply of goods and 
services did not require extensive analysis. It was given in the short run 
and then imposed an upper limit on the volume of demand that was feasi­
ble without an acceleration of inflation. In the medium run it reacted to 
the evolution of demand in such a way that, if the latter grew regularly, 
productive capacity would grow at the same pace. The supply of labor 
was the only real constraint on expansion.
But a satisfactory economic evolution required a conscious and clever 
demand management by the authorities. Indeed, aggregate demand was 
subject to spontaneous changes that could either disrupt economic growth 
or induce inflationary pressures. These changes could come from the in­
ternational environment, alternatively stimulating or depressing; they 
could come from the actions of public authorities concerned with defence 
building, with the launching of new social programs or with restoring 
budget balance; and they could also come from the private economy, 
whose needs evolve and which is subject to waves of optimism or pes­
simism.
In order to perform its stabilizing function in par with its allocation 
and distribution functions, public finance had to be geared by a correct 
diagnosis of the spontaneous trends of demand and by proper estimates of 
the impacts that its own actions would have on this demand. This is why 
teams of economists had to be working close to the public authorities in 
order to assist for the required diagnosis and estimation. These 
economists were particularly important among the main users of statisti­
cal information which had to be developed, and of macroeconometric 
models which had to be built and kept up.
To stabilize the evolution of aggregate demand, governments could use 
the many instruments of budgetary policy and of monetary policy, appar­
ently more instruments than were really required. But three kinds of dif­
ficulties made matters less simple than they might have looked to be. (The 
following points are more thoroughly discussed in J. Tobin, 1990.)
In the first place action was not instantaneous. Lags were unavoidable 
in diagnosing exogenous shifts, in obtaining and implementing decisions 
through the governmental machinery, and in seeing the effects of these 
decisions through an economic system within which many types of lag 
were also present. Various means of stimulating or restraining aggregate 
demand were not exposed to the same lag structure, and this in ways that 
varied from one country to another. The best choice of instruments then 
depended on national specificities as well as on the need for a more or less 
speedy intervention.
In the second place many erratic shocks on the various components of 
demand and on the other variables of the economic system could not be 




























































































over the accuracy of the control would depend on the choice of instru­
ments. The presence of uncertainties recommended in particular that gov­
ernments use several types of instrument rather than a single one, in the 
same way that a portfolio manager does better to diversify his invest­
ments.
In the third place even the best control of aggregate demand might lead 
to an outcome that leaves something to be desired. Early on it was real­
ized that Phillips law implied a trade-off between employment and infla­
tion restraint: a high aggregate demand would lead to low unemployment 
but at the cost of accelerating inflation. There was then a NAIRU, a “non­
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment”, and demand management 
stabilizing policy could do no more on average than keep unemployment 
around the level imposed by this NAIRU. If this looked uncomfortably 
high, instruments other than those of budgetary and monetary policies 
might have to be used. A role was then often proposed for price and in­
come policies; but strong reservations against them were also expressed 
because of the disruption they would impose on the proper working of the 
price system and/or because of the lack of power of those policies in 
achieving their main objective, namely controlling inflation.
3. Institutionalists, post-Keynesians and regulationists
The conception of macroeconomic policy whose broad lines I have just 
recalled was not unanimously accepted. Often moved by ideological con­
cerns a number of economists expressed dissatisfaction and argued for 
something that would be wholly different and give to the State either 
much more or much less power. With the hindsight we are afforded by 
the passage of time, how should we analyze these dissenting views? What 
should we now remember of them? Let us begin with those that attracted 
sympathy on the radical side of the political spectrum.
In Europe in particular there has long been a substantial group of 
economists objecting to the actual forms of modem industrial develop­
ment and this group has always been particularly popular in Latin coun­
tries. During the post-war years many of those economists imagined that 
proper planning could implement a different type of development and 
some of them proposed guidelines for what they claimed to be appropri­
ate strategies.
These days it would be too easy merely to dismiss all this activity as 
having completely failed. Neither the priority given to building a base of 
heavy industries (“les industries industrialisantes” sometimes stressed by 
F. Perroux), nor the inward looking protectionist strategies, nor again the 
belief in the intrinsic value of socialist management (“l ’autre logique” of 
some French economists) brought, where they were tried, the favorable 
consequences that wishful thinking had anticipated. I do not believe, how­
ever, that, taking argument of this experience, one would be justified in 




























































































tivations that inspired it are significant and will appear again in the fu­
ture.
Commenting on the ideas of this school and on the lessons to be re­
membered from its reflections and its history, I shall not stress the many 
subdivisions or even oppositions I ought to recognize were I able to de­
vote more space to this aspect of my subject. Speaking of a school of 
thoughts is even, I admit, an “abus de langage”, but an admissible one 
here. For our present purpose we have mainly to consider the three rea­
sons that led these economists to object to the prevailing wisdom: they 
wanted different policy objectives, they had a different vision of the 
functioning of the economic system, and they assigned a different role to 
the scientific discipline of economics. Since I have more to say on the sec­
ond reason than on the other two I shall finish with it.
The teaching on economic policy formation clearly distinguished, as in­
deed it must do, between the choice of the ultimate objectives assigned to 
policies and the determination of the best combination of instruments that 
will permit the reaching of these objectives: political authorities have to 
choose the objectives; these being given, economists determine the re­
quired actions. In practice, however, this teaching was supposed to be 
applied to the particular goal of full employment with stability, a goal that 
was taken as corresponding to political wishes and as being reasonably 
within reach. But it was precisely this double supposition that some 
economists were not ready to accept.
For them full employment was not enough. They wanted a different 
society from the one in which they were living, a society that would be 
more equal and give more power to the workers. Even when admitting 
the existence of a trend toward better social protection in European mar­
ket economies, they viewed it as being intended to save the capitalist eco­
nomic system, while they claimed a profound change of system. Many of 
them were also skeptical with respect to the idea that full employment 
could long be maintained by demand management policies.
Moved by strong ethical feelings, these economists deviated from the 
rest of the profession as regards their conception of economic science, 
and this in two ways. In the first place they wanted a broader definition of 
the field, some even claimed to embrace all social phenomena simultane­
ously, thus denying the usefulness of a discipline pretending to isolate 
strictly economic phenomena. In the second place they objected to the idea 
of a neutral and “value-free” science; neutrality was impossible, according 
to them, when the issues concerned social phenomena; scientists had to 
express their views on the objectives to be assigned to policies; they had to 
advocate for the changes they thought to be desirable. G. Myrdal is prob­
ably the best-known among the economists who strongly voiced these two 
points (see for instance G. Myrdal, 1979).
I must react here on this conception of the economic science and ex­
press my conviction that the history of the last two decades gives support 




























































































ideal, never fully achieved, but an ideal that professional economists 
should aim at, because their role is to inform about the facts and phenom­
ena in their field of competence; collective choices are wiser if they are 
better informed; the economist’s testimony is discredited and therefore 
useless if it is found to be blurred by his own preferences. Similarly we 
economists should not pretend to give to our discipline ambitions that it 
cannot meet; the main reproach addressed to us by our fellow citizens is 
that we are not good enough at understanding and forecasting economic 
phenomena; it is not that we do not explain the whole socio-economic 
evolution. Limiting the ambition of economics in this way does not mean, 
of course, that we should neglect the social, institutional or political deter­
minants of economic phenomena, but only that we cannot reasonably 
pretend to explain these determinants also.
This disagreement with the school of thoughts I am now discussing does 
not mean either that I should recommend paying no attention to its work. 
On the contrary the recent evolution of ideas gives at least some partial 
support to its criticism of the vision that was common in the ’60s about 
the functioning of the economic system; the same evolution of ideas 
should increase the interest brought outside of this school to some of its 
research work.
What was called by some “the neoclassical synthesis” gave its theoretical 
background to the vision widely held in the ’60s. It assumed that a proper 
understanding of economics was reached with on the one hand general 
equilibrium theories of the Walrasian type, particularly appropriate for 
long term phenomena, and on the other hand Keynesian demand analysis, 
sufficient for dealing with macroeconomic short term phenomena. The 
criticism for long addressed to this synthesis from the left side can be ex­
pressed in modem words. On the one hand market disequilibria are more 
prevailing and significant than the synthesis admitted: they may extend 
much longer and, even when small, they may play an important role if 
they persist. On the other hand supply analysis is at times more important 
than demand analysis because productive capacities do not spontaneously 
adapt in a proper and efficient way unless some conditions ignored by 
demand analysis are met. For these two reasons studying the trends and 
disparities in the profit rate has a crucial role to play in attempts at un­
derstanding capitalist evolution.
The research work of this school of thoughts provides us with at least 
two interesting kinds of contribution. Some of them may be called 
“historico-descriptive” because they aim at showing what are all the main 
features of the socioeconomic evolution in our countries; they take advan­
tage of the possibility of quantification now offered by statistics, econo­
metrics and even macroeconomic modelling; but they want to avoid re­
stricting attention to the commonly considered economic aspects and they 
do not express their findings within a well defined theoretical framework; 
at most they venture to propose very broad hypotheses within which 




























































































program recently launched at WIDER under the leadership of S. Marglin 
gathers some of those now engaged in this type of work, whose inspira­
tion follows a long tradition in economic history. Even when contribu­
tions of this type do not lend themselves to generalization, they bring to 
our attention cases in which the approximations used in our common way 
of thinking are particularly weak.
A second kind of interesting original contribution deals with the role of 
institutions, broadly understood, on some specific economic phenomena. 
Particularly noteworthy in this respect is the systematic study of dispari­
ties in practices concerning labor management and wage setting. This 
study was undertaken long ago within labor economics, but until fairly 
recently it has been almost foreign to mainstream macroeconomic re­
search. One should note here that recent developments in microeconomics 
also bring to the forefront the role of norms and institutions as ways of 
dealing with the coordination problems that incomplete and asymmetric 
information, as well as costs of various kinds, impose on contractual ar­
rangements. There is thus a range of questions for the study of which new 
methodologies seem to be emerging.1
4. Classical macroeconomics
The common wisdom of the ’60s was also rejected at the time by 
economists who remained faithful to the main economic teaching of the 
first two decades of this century and kept arguing for a free market sys­
tem. During the last twenty years, these economists have had the satisfac­
tion of seeing that within younger generations their ideas were not only 
again attracting interest but also stimulating innovative research work. In 
some quarters the “new classical macroeconomics” imposed the new look 
one had to adhere to.
In order to understand what the existence and growth of this intellectual 
current may mean for the study of economic policies, one has to distin­
guish three attitudes that may be found in the same individual but have 
different implications, i.e. a general distrust vis-à-vis any kind of gov­
ernment action, the feeling that Keynesian policies will fail to reach their 
objective, or a full confidence in the spontaneous working of market 
economies.
I shall be brief on the first attitude, which inspired the so-called “public 
choice” movement. According to it governments cannot be relied on as 
acting for the common good. Ministers are politicians moved by the wish 
to remain in power or at least be re-elected. The actual working of the 
political system gives no guarantee that such motivations will lead to col­
lectively favorable decisions. Government administration is made up of 
civil servants who are pursuing their own interests and are in any case
1 This evolution is not always welcomed by those who have long considered themselves 
as “institutional economists”. Indeed, a recent International Economic Association round 




























































































badly informed of what would be needed. (In his Nobel lecture J. 
Buchanan (1987) was careful to dissociate himself from the interpretation 
of the public choice theory I am now referring to, which he attributed to 
“overly zealous users” of the economic theory of politics.)
I am not particularly competent when it comes to judging the scientific 
value of such an analysis, which I consider as belonging to political 
science rather than to economics. If I had accepted its most extreme con­
clusions, I would have immediately stopped working in the study of eco­
nomic policies. Fortunately, my life in the French civil service, my ac­
quaintance with a number of ministers, and my relations with interna­
tional political organizations permit me to know by experience that the 
cynical view entertained by some public choice theorists is no closer to 
the facts than the naive view of an always benevolent, perfectly informed 
and effectively powerful government. In my present capacity, I might 
remind you of Jean Monnet and of the many people who, following him, 
sacrificed their own interest for the improvement of the society in which 
their grandchildren would live.
The second attitude was more specific. It raised strong reservations 
about active demand management policies and was often called 
“monetarism”. As economists well know, it went through two stages. M. 
Friedman was the advocate of what was later named “Monetarism mark 
I”. He claimed that demand management could only have temporary ef­
fects. Keynesians were, he argued, concentrating their attention on a short 
term trade-off between unemployment and inflation; this led them to rec­
ommend policies that were biased in the direction of being too stimulat­
ing, because the adaptation of price expectations to observed inflation 
made the medium term effect much more inflationary than appeared on a 
Phillips curve tracing short- terms changes; in the long run expansionary 
demand management would lead to ever increasing inflation rates if it 
kept aiming at a lower unemployment rate than what he called the 
“natural rate”. Although the macroeconomic theory used by Friedman in 
his argument was not quite explicit and remains disputable on various 
scores, I think a valid message to policy-makers ought to be remembered: 
the inflationary cost of expansionary demand will extend over many 
years; this does not rule out such an action but makes it less attractive than 
was often thought in the ’60s.
“Monetarism mark II”, which bloomed in the ’70s, claimed much more, 
namely that macroeconomic policies were ineffective, even in the short 
run, except perhaps to the extent they could take private agents by 
surprise. In order to see why this was so, one had only to consider the 
formation of the expectations and the best hypothesis economists could 
make in this respect, namely, so it was argued, that expectations are 
rational.
It would be out of place here, and would need too long a discussion, to 
show why such claims have only a weak scientific validity; one would 




























































































foundations of the assertions, with the role of the market clearing 
hypothesis in particular. What the theory of economic policy ought to 
remember, from the research work carried out by this school, is not the 
main positive propositions that it aimed at proving, but rather a number 
of critical questions it raised about the methodology that had been defined 
and promoted in the ’60s. I shall come back to this point in a moment.
The third attitude was a general confidence in the idea that the sponta­
neous economic evolution generated by the operation of a free market 
system would be as satisfactory as was feasible, so that pretending to im­
prove on this evolution was bound to failure. After some time it appeared 
in particular that the main issue behind the debates initiated by 
“monetarism mark I” was to know whether market economies needed to 
be stabilized: Keynesians like F. Modigliani (1977) had thought so, while 
M. Friedman (1968) had denied it, showing however a lack of concern 
for short term perturbations around a natural long run path. Much more 
recently the real business cycle literature went further, arguing that 
macroeconomic fluctuations were the natural and efficient response to ir­
regularities in technical progress (see for example R. Lucas, 1987, and C. 
Plosser, 1989). Again time is too short for me to explain the lack of 
credibility of this recent theory.
Dealing more generally with confidence in free markets I should also 
stress that spontaneous convergence toward a satisfactory long-run path 
remains an uncomfortably pending issue in economics. Recent history 
shows how important microeconomic incentives can be for the efficiency 
of production and exchange. This we should not forget, in particular be­
cause some policy interventions may destroy incentives and have alloca­
tive costs. But this history also raises worries about the possibility of ma­
jor systemic instabilities that may be quite difficult to control.
Coming back to my main subject I may give my own assessment, after 
these many years of classical criticism directed at the economic policy 
teaching of twenty years ago. It seems to me that the basic core of this 
teaching stood well under the fire, but that it now needs a less confident 
and less simple-minded presentation than was common in those days.
The study of macroeconomic policy needs to be more prudent and 
more sophisticated with respect to both the model of the economy and the 
problematics of policy action. The model should take proper account of 
supply conditions and of expectations formation; it should be more gen­
erally consonant with the present state of our macroeconomic knowledge, 
which we shall consider in the next lecture. Even so, it cannot pretend to 
be in all respects immune from important misrepresentations of the rele­
vant phenomena.
Economic policy makers should no longer be presented only as choos­
ing the values of a set of instruments so as to maximize a social welfare 
function under the constraints defined by a model of the economy, a 
model moreover that could be taken as deterministic because of nice cer­




























































































the latter properties less powerful than was thought. More importantly, a 
policy should seldom be viewed as an isolated action but much more fre­
quently as a rale to be applied over time by a government while the sur­
rounding or prospective economic conditions evolve. It should be recog­
nized that private agents may change their behavior when the policy rule 
is revised. This private reaction will itself depend on the credibility at­
tached to the idea that a given mle will be maintained in the future, when 
governments are replaced, or even without any such replacement simply 
because decisions need not be time consistent (by which I mean the fol­
lowing: it may be that, in a year from now, one will find it interesting to 
deviate from what appears today as an optimal program, which specifies 
not only present decisions but also the strategy to be applied in the 
future).
The criticism raised by classical economists, as well as the experience 
of the last two decades, has also led to giving economic policy formation a 
different time perspective. It should not focus attention on the next year 
or so, as was common at the time of “fine tuning”; this might be much too 
short-sighted, not only because of the risk of a destabilizing stop-and-go 
altemance, but also because medium term requirements may be quite dif­
ferent from short term ones and are of course much more crucial for 
economic welfare.
The revision of the time perspective, the increased difficulty of the de­
mands then addressed to macroeconomic scientific knowledge, disap­
pointment with the performances of policies at least during the decade 
1975-85, and the internationalization of economies, all these developments 
have also changed the views commonly entertained about the effectiveness 
of macroeconomic policy and made them much more modest. This must 
also be fully recognized.
5. Intellectual fashion and experts’ resistance
Reflection on the nature and role of economic policy should also look at 
the history of the last two decades from a different point of view. Indeed, 
those living in academic circles or close to them might often have be­
lieved that the methodology taught in the ’60s was completely overthrown 
by the critics that came later from both sides of the political spectrum. 
But on the contrary, when one considers the methodology used today in 
government agencies, international organizations, central banks and even 
in most independent institutes, which are often related to universities, one 
actually sees a continuity. It is true that economic advisers no longer have 
the aura they enjoyed in the ’60s; quite naturally they share the disrepute 
attached to past policy failures. But from a technical point of view the 
evolution of the practice after twenty years has not been as great as had to 
be expected. How can this be explained?
One possibility has to be dismissed, namely that the explanation would 




























































































methodology is subject to some such lag since new ideas cannot be di­
rectly operational for technicians in charge of applications; appropriate 
tools have to be developed and teams of experts have to leam new ways of 
working; they may even resist the change if they are afraid of becoming 
obsolete or if they are lazy. But in the present case this type of explana­
tion clearly does not suffice. Twenty years is too long a period for the lag 
in question. And critics have not come out with proposals that have been 
recognized as good and that practitioners could apply. Whether one turns 
attention to the left or to the right, one does not see any alternative 
methodology that would begin to emerge and that one could anticipate as 
likely to supersede present usage within the coming decade.
Particularly revealing in this respect is what happened when some of 
the most vocal opponents to existing practice were suddenly called to ad­
vise newly elected governments. In some instances, after various initial 
contrary pronouncements that had no effect, but in other instances with­
out even so much, they accepted the prevailing way of formulating a di­
agnosis on business trends or of analyzing the likely impact of contem­
plated decisions. After 1981 those advisers of President Mitterrand who 
had been advocating “l ’autre logique” or “l ’anti-economique” were not 
long in accepting the analysis of experts who continued using the same 
methods as before. A similar story can be told about the supply siders 
who arrived with President Reagan in Washington or about the few new 
classical macroeconomists who have joined the US administration in re­
cent years (see the beginning of the article of B. McCallum, 1989). Even 
in Britain, where the change of economic philosophy with Mrs Thatcher 
was more determined than elsewhere, former methods of analysis have 
been restored.
Those closest to proposing an alternative methodology were some 
macro econometricians promoting the use of the VAR technique (vector 
autoregression technique) (see in particular T. Doan, R. Litterman and C. 
Sims, 1984). Discussing their ideas is interesting and I shall devote some 
attention to it in the next lecture. From our present point of view let me 
simply say that a widespread adoption of their approach is very unlikely. 
I might also point out the curious fact that their work was received with 
sympathy by monetarists but that it gives no place to the thesis of a natu­
ral stability of market economies.
The best explanation of what may appear to some as a paradox is that 
the criticism raised against the methodology of the ’60s was overempha­
sized in academic and intellectual circles. I have recognized in this lecture 
that some important lessons must be drawn from this criticism. But it is 
not as destructive as has too often been said. On the contrary, experience 
with the application of the methodology has shown that the main causes of 
economic policy failures were related to mistaken assessments on particu­
lar phenomena and not to undue reliance on past technical teaching.
The whole matter brings to the forefront a kind of malfunctioning of 




























































































taken too seriously. This applies particularly to the profession of aca­
demic economists, where frequent claims for complete revisions of prior 
beliefs far exceed what has normally to occur in a lively science, which 
must of course avoid petrification. The best brains are fooled neither by 
the originality of bright new ideas nor by the sophistication of their theo­
retical and/or mathematical elaboration. However, within the ranks and 
files many are overly impressed by the few individuals they consider as 
stars, whom they must praise and would like to imitate. Unfortunately 
these ranks and files exist all over the world, even in the most remote 
places. The stars should be better aware of the responsibility that they are, 
perhaps unintentionally, assuming.
II. Queries about the value and foundations of 
macroeconomic knowledge
In no discipline can one discuss problems raised by the application of 
science without considering the reliability of knowledge in the field. This 
remark particularly applies to macroeconomics nowadays. The general 
public is often led to believe that economists know very little that would 
be definite and that they disagree among themselves about everything. A 
recent example is given in France by the publication of a book written in 
a satirical vein dealing precisely with the reliability of supposedly objec­
tive assessments made by economists (see B. Maris, 1990); the point is not 
so much the substance of the book but rather the considerable repercus­
sions it immediately provoked in the press with accompanying comments 
on the lack of perceptivity of economists (“les économistes sont-ils nuis?” 
was the title of the material published on this occasion by Le nouvel ob­
servateur, 8-14 March 1990). Clearly, we must face the question: is our 
knowledge not too imperfect to permit us to recommend policies? This 
will be the subject of the first section of this lecture.
Considering the question will induce us to go a little more deeply into 
the foundations of our macroeconomic knowledge. For a number of im­
portant policy issues the nature and reliability of recommendations given 
by advisers will indeed depend on the nature and solidity of these founda­
tions. This is why I shall devote section 2 to a general presentation of the 
methodology of macroeconomics; I feel fairly confident that, at the level 
of generality I adopt, my presentation will not be too questionable, even if 
it anticipates somewhat on a consensus that has not yet been reached.
Perhaps more questionable will be the two following sections 3 and 4 in 
which I shall consider two substantive aspects of the microeconomic re­
alities underlying macroeconomic phenomena, individual rationality and 
market efficiency respectively. Various macroeconomic theories, with 
different policy implications, differ precisely in that they fail to make the 




























































































which of these hypotheses best fit the facts. Such tests must be given high 
priority on the agenda of macroeconomic research.
I shall end with section 5 which in particular discusses an issue about 
which an assessment matters for the policy questions examined in the fol­
lowing two lectures, namely the Schumpeterian impact of European unifi­
cation. In this example one can see some of the limits to our macroeco­
nomic knowledge and realize how disturbing they are. Bringing this truth 
out into the open will, I hope, help in forcing us to take note of one of the 
greatest challenges faced by our discipline. I would hope that it might 
stimulate fruitful research, but I must confess my ideas are uncertain as to 
how this research should go.
1. How reliable is our knowledge?
For most users a perfect accuracy of economic knowledge would mean 
the absence of any error: no error in the data concerning the past, up to 
yesterday, no error in economic forecasting, and no error in the assess­
ment of effects that changes in circumstances or in policies may induce. 
Clearly such a perfect accuracy cannot be reached. But how far are we 
from it in each of the three aspects of macroeconomic knowledge I have 
just recalled?
(i) Great improvements have occurred during the past fifty years in 
statistics. I shall not dwell on them, but rather remind you of the existence 
of remaining significant inaccuracies that are often overlooked, even by 
those people who otherwise proclaim a general distrust of statistics. In 
some rare cases an indicator of this inaccuracy exists, for instance when 
the same variable is measured by two independent methods (as is the case 
for the number of people unemployed, evaluated either from a labor 
force survey of households or from administrative records of labor ex­
change offices). The existence of inaccuracies is also revealed in some 
cases by the discrepancy between various statistics, for instance the fact 
that the current balance of payments of all the countries in the world do 
not add up to zero, as they should, but to a sizable and variable negative 
number. More often, however, statisticians have a feeling, rather than a 
measure, of the presence of inaccuracies.
Imperfect accuracy may, of course, be innocuous for users who for in­
stance may only need to know an order of magnitude or the size of a 
variation rather than the absolute level of a variable. Most frequently no 
harm is really done, notwithstanding the protests, by provisional aggre­
gate figures that have to be substantially revised when more complete ba­
sic data reach statistical agencies. But this is not always so.
Speaking as I do now in general terms, I must stress that, among the 
various kinds of wide uses of statistics, intercountry comparisons are the 
most vulnerable to damaging error. Indeed, for our present purpose such 




























































































metric inference on specific issues; they also strongly influence the gen­
eral public’s judgement about the relative performance of alternative eco­
nomic systems and about the relative success of alternative policy strate­
gies. Unfortunately the international comparability of statistics is often 
weak. The problem has long been known by statisticians and international 
organizations that have made efforts to improve on the situation, particu­
larly within the Common Market. Moreover, the problem should not be 
taken as a reason for preferring impressionistic assessments to serious 
statistical evaluation. But in quite a few cases such evaluation remains im­
precise, while the multiplicity of factors that reflection ought to take into 
account would actually require an accurate measure of each.
One cannot avoid thinking today about the dramatic change of dominant 
views held during the past decades on the performance and prospects of 
Eastern European economies. Part of the explanation no doubt comes 
from the gigantic misinformation to which we have long been exposed 
concerning the real situation in these economies. But part of it may also 
come from the fact that a number of economists have chosen uncritically 
to believe and diffuse an image that fitted their own ideological prefer­
ences. Today, as the change of the economic system in Eastern Europe is 
a major policy issue for us, we should be careful to achieve as much ob­
jectivity in our assessment as is feasible. Improving on present knowledge 
of the facts would already be quite a valuable research objective.
(ii) How effective is economic forecasting? The answer clearly depends 
on a standard for judging when errors are excessive. Some people do not 
seem to realize that the standard cannot be the absence of any error. This 
appears particularly when one notes that nowadays critics usually put on 
top of their list of laments the failure of economists to predict crashes and 
other price movements on the stock exchange. They have not understood 
that, if the exchange perfectly valued the price of shares, changes in this 
price would be unpredictable: the best forecast for tomorrow would be 
today’s price; hence no change, however large it may turn out to be, 
would prove that the forecast of no change was not the optimal one to 
make (since I do not believe evaluation on the stock exchange is perfect, I 
am ready to accept a part of the blame, but only a very small part of what 
I am currently hearing). For most other economic variables the situation 
is not as extreme; but perfect foresight remains unfeasible.
Since I am now protesting against unwarranted criticism, I may add 
that in some cases the forecasting errors of economists are to a large 
extent due to the forecasting inabilities of others who should know better. 
We are blamed for instance because we were not good at predicting large 
changes in the price of crude oil. But who gave us reliable forecasts of 
political events in the Middle East? Moreover, were we not told by 
specialists in 1974 that a large quantity of oil would be extracted from tar 




























































































The best standard against which to judge a forecast made by economists 
on economic matters would be the forecast simultaneously made by others 
on the same variables. The two are not independent, of course. But if it 
turns out that economists make smaller forecasting errors, one seems jus­
tified in concluding that their contribution is positive and potentially use­
ful for the decision process. I do not know of any systematic comparison 
of this type. But I can testify personally that through the period 1975 to 
1982 French economists were bitterly accused because they were forecast­
ing a rapid increase in unemployment, an increase which most others 
were refusing to see and which in fact turned out to be still larger (some 
figures about this are given in E. Malinvaud (198), p. I l l ,  footnote 27; 
they could be updated).
(iii) The available literature provides us with another kind of comparison, 
one that is actually even more interesting from our present point of view 
because it bears not only on pure forecasting but also on the measure of 
effects to be expected from changes in the values of policy instruments. 
The comparison concerns the use made of macroeconometric models that 
have been constructed precisely in order to serve for policy advising. The 
results may be said to be both comforting and disturbing (see V. 
Zamowitz, 1978; R. Fildes, 1985).
They are comforting because they show that macroeconometric models 
lead to smaller forecasting errors than mechanical extrapolations of the 
time series of the respective variables. This result appears when the 
forecasting horizon is a year ahead or more. For the very short term the 
use of models has a dubious value; on the other hand, no economic policy 
decision can have such a short horizon.
The results are disturbing because the accuracy remains weak. This is 
so even for conditional forecasts, which are computed ex post by 
assigning to the exogenous variables of the model the values they actually 
had (values which are not all known in practice at the time of forecast­
ing). This disquieting objective assessment concerns not only the use of 
macroeconometric models, but much more generally our scientific 
knowledge to the extent that it is embodied in these models. Indeed, we 
cannot pretend that our advice will lead to a tight control of economic 
evolution. Considering the stakes, however, even a loose control is better 
than no control at all.
However, two questions relating to the use of models for macroeco­
nomic policy evaluation are worth considering. First there is the appro­
priate size of the model, i.e. the level of detail it goes into in its represen­
tation of economic variables structures and behavior. Any model, how­
ever big, grossly simplifies. This means that it is exposed to aggregation 
errors and that it is not directly suited to the study of all kinds of policy 
measures one may want to consider. Conscious of this, model builders in 
the late ’60s and ’70s often chose very large systems. Nowadays there is a 




























































































and flexible. This is due to the realization that size does not contribute 
much to accuracy; it is also certainly due to the decrease in the demand 
for policy evaluation: as confidence in economic advising receded, one 
saw that decision makers were less eager to ask economists to work out 
the consequences of many alternative policy packages.
The second question is to know whether the use of macroeconometric 
models does not lead to bias in the estimation of the impacts of policies. I 
was confronted by the question in the late ’70s when I was told that the 
models in use at INSEE gave a too favorable vision of an aggregate 
demand stimulation or of a devaluation of currency, but a too unfavorable 
vision of a restoration of business profit margins. This experience in­
spired some of the comments I presented in E. Malinvaud (1981). 
Similarly the criticism that the models neglected major changes in the 
expectations of private agents after a policy shift was made, either in 
general terms or more specifically on some occasions, as for instance in 
England in 1980 when models were said to overestimate the employment 
cost of the credible disinflationary policy of Mrs. Thatcher.
Since models are not perfect, they may indeed be subject to systematic 
errors. This eventuality should always be kept in mind and tested when 
possible. But as long as no evidence exists on the direction of the bias, no 
consequence follows as to the evaluation of policies.
My personal fear is not so much the existence of an important bias but 
rather an increasing degree of uncertainty in the evaluation of effects as 
one moves from short term decisions, intended to have an impact in the 
near future, to medium term ones, whose impact will be more progres­
sive but more durable. It may very well be then that econometricians are 
unable to say anything precise about medium term decisions; this may be 
interpreted as meaning that these decisions will have no effect, which is 
quite a different thing of course . I tried to spell this out a little more 
thoroughly in E. Malinvaud (1989).
2. About the methodology of macroeconomics
Although a significant part of macroeconomic evolution will always re­
main unpredictable, we must strive to make progress with respect to the 
present situation. It is fairly safe to say that substantial progress can only 
come from a better knowledge of phenomena and not from a higher 
sophistication of forecasting techniques. Improvement in these techniques 
will always be welcome and should not be discredited, but it has only a 
limited scope as long as macroeconomic behaviour is not more precisely 
understood. Thus the whole of macroeconomic research is potentially use­
ful for policies. This being the case, it is not inappropriate for me from 
now on in this lecture to outline the methodological principles which in 
my view this research should recognize in order to bear fruit. I consider 
the following ideas rather trivial, but they are worth repeating because 




























































































The main point is to stress that macroeconomics requires an intimate 
combination of theoretical analysis of underlying microeconomic opera­
tions on the one hand, and inference on data on the other. Some have 
tended to reduce one or the other of the two parts to a minimum. I 
strongly believe they cannot succeed.
A long line of economists has been motivated by the aim of building 
macroeconomic theory directly from macroeconomic observation, in the 
same way that the laws of physics were first discovered by the study of 
macroscopic manifestations. Considering the work of a group of the most 
modem representatives of this line of thinking shows the insuperable dif­
ficulty of such an undertaking.
C. Sims has argued for a direct statistical analysis of the set of time 
series concerning the main economic aggregates (see for instance C. Sims, 
1980, or more specifically related to forecasting T. Doan, R. Litterman 
and C. Sims, 1984). In the spirit of data analysis he suggests a fit of these 
series on a general vector autoregression model that should be free of a 
priori restrictions that some theorists might think imposing. This ap­
proach may detect or confirm some regularities appearing in short term 
fluctuations. But it can hardly do more. Indeed, in practice it has to re­
strict its investigations to a small number of series and to assume the au­
toregression to extend only on a small number of successive observations. 
I may predict with confidence therefore, that claims once made by the 
proponents of this empirical methodology will not be fulfilled.
Indeed, the approach does not pay enough attention to two important 
aspects of the origin of the macroeconomic time series and of the 
phenomena that explain their actual values. Firstly these series are not 
obtained by controlled experiments of the type common in most natural 
sciences; they are merely observations of a reality that is subject to the 
actions of many causes. Recognizing all major causes and disentangling 
the part to be attributed to each of them is difficult in principle and would 
require in practice many more observations than are typically available, 
unless other sources of information can also be used. Secondly, economic 
activity takes place in a social, political, legal and technical environment 
which varies. This does not make knowledge of economic phenomena 
intractable, because the impact of most variations can be identified. But 
precisely this requires a theory of the phenomena.
While the economist, in comparison with his colleagues of the natural 
sciences, is handicapped by the paucity of his macroeconomic observa­
tions, he has on the contrary the advantage of a direct understanding of 
the elementary behavior and operations that generate the phenomena he 
has to study. Indeed, he knows what households and firms are, why they 
work and trade, which constraints they are subject to, and so on. 
Neglecting all this information, as the empirical approach proposes, 
cannot be an efficient research strategy. Moreover, serious theoretical 
analysis is clearly required in order to retrieve what this important part 




























































































strategy may be sketched out as follows: in order to obtain a good model 
of a phenomenon we must first derive a specification from more or less 
embracing but also appropriate microeconomic theories; within the 
framework of this specification macroeconomic data will show us features 
that would otherwise completely escape our vision; even microeconomic 
data will then be useful for understanding macroeconomics.
Taking a stand at the opposite extreme of the empiricist position, 
another long line of economists has been motivated by the aim of building 
a unified microeconomic theory that would explain all economic 
phenomena while avoiding the simplifying hypotheses that inevitably 
appear in the derivation of macroeconomic models. This last methodolog­
ical requirement means in particular that, except perhaps until the theory 
is complete, macroeconomic data are useless. Actually, with only very 
few exceptions (such as W. Hildenbrand, 1989), this line of economists 
pays no attention to statistical data at all.
I need not insist on the importance of the (neoclassical) microeconomic 
research program, whose achievements have proved to be fruitful in 
many respects, in particular for the clarification and progress of the con­
ceptual analysis of many issues. However, keeping in mind the subject of 
these lectures, I must say that the conclusions arrived at so far are much 
too indeterminate to provide us with what we need. This is often force­
fully argued, for instance by A. Kirman (1989). Moreover we know that 
it will always be so: the system which any microeconomic theory of some 
generality leads to is somewhat complex and contains many unknown 
parameters; hence its solution may have almost any kind of behavior.
This cannot mean that economic phenomena are wholly unpredictable. 
It simply means that, in order to predict them, one has to use more than 
pure logical deduction from the general hypotheses which our direct 
knowledge of elementary behavior permits us safely to select. This extra 
ingredient is of course provided by all the data at our disposal, microeco­
nomic as well as macroeconomic, including those that a healthy movement 
of experimental economists now obtains. Induction from all kinds of data 
will permit us to make our models of the economic system more specific 
than pure microeconomic theory would grant.
The methodology whose basic elements I have just outlined views the 
economy as a system in which individual agents, be they persons, firms or 
other institutional entities, interact in various ways that are more or less 
codified, each agent having its own aims and its own degree of autonomy. 
In other words I am accepting at least the core of what is sometimes 
called “methodological individualism”. But there is no available alterna­
tive if one believes, and I do, that economics has to progressively orga­
nize and accumulate knowledge in its field of competence in the same way 
as any other science.
But accepting this does not imply endorsing all the principles that some 
economists tend to present as necessarily ensuing. We must keep our eyes 




























































































we must take due account of them where they occur. This is why I now 
intend to discuss the two main sets of issues that lie at the foundation of 
economic modeling: the limits, if any, of first individual rationality and 
second market efficiency.
3. Individual rationality and its limits
I am not going to enter into a philosophical discussion about the meaning 
of rationality. For the economist it is simply the notion that individual 
agents behave so as to best achieve their aims, taking account of all the 
opportunities and information available to them, as well as of the 
constraints imposed on them. In the development of theories and models, 
when applying the rationality principle, one has to particularize it with 
specific, and even occasionally somewhat narrow, hypotheses on the aims, 
the opportunities, the information or the constraints.
The first thing to say about the rationality principle is how useful it 
proves to be. Its contribution to making economics better organized and 
more rigorous has been tremendous and will continue to be. Without it 
one cannot imagine how one could mobilize all the direct knowledge we 
have about elementary economic activities, a knowledge of which I have 
already signalled the importance. What is disputable hardly concerns the 
principle itself but rather its application.
First I may quickly recall how the particularization of the principle 
follows from restrictive hypotheses that are introduced in the representa­
tion of the aims, the opportunities and the information of the agents. For 
instance, one assumes that the individual behaves as if he were caring only 
for his own consumptions. Moreover the utility function explaining this 
behaviour is often supposed to be more or less strongly separable with re­
spect to time and/or uncertain events. Firms are said to aim at maximizing 
profits, but this has to be made more specific when uncertainties are 
present because firms have more narrow trading facilities than in an ideal 
system in which markets would exist for all contingent commodities.
For the specification of the constraints one often assumes away ra­
tioning on any markets. This means in particular that liquidity require­
ments are ruled out, as well of course as involuntary unemployment. We 
should also be aware of the common neglect of additional restrictions to 
which agents may de facto be subject not only because of regulations but 
also because of customs or social norms.
Considering information and the nature of anticipations I may speak of 
restrictive hypothesis when one assumes exact expectations (or else 
“rational expectations”) in a study of short or medium-term evolutions, 
for which agents have an imperfect knowledge of the facts and an imper­
fect understanding of the phenomena. A fortiori it is highly restrictive to 
assume that agents believe with full confidence in the model that a 




























































































economy, a model which may actually be rejected by some of his 
colleagues.
Of course, one cannot specify a theory without making restrictive 
assumptions. The ones I have briefly surveyed are not necessarily bad. 
But they are clearly not implied by the rationality principle, as I defined 
it. They are good or bad, depending on what the alternatives for the 
particular problem under consideration are. Often the alternative may 
look ad hoc, hence arbitrary.
But when representing economic behaviour one must pay attention to 
all observations about it available, even if they do not quite agree with the 
rationality principle. In some cases simple hypotheses, even though ac­
cused of being ad hoc, fit the observations better than the assumptions 
derived from a strict application of the classical teaching of microeco­
nomic theory. Indeed, as H. Simon has argued for many years, agents 
have only a “bounded rationality” in dealing with the situations they are 
facing; they do not fully maximize; they tend to select decisions that ap­
pear natural to them; these decisions may depend on habits that are no 
longer fully adequate, as well as on the procedural context in which 
agents are placed rather than only on the final results achieved (see for 
instance H. Simon, 1982).
These comments are not meant to give support to loose thinking. On the 
contrary they stress that we cannot rely on a dogmatic insistence on the 
rationality of behavior and that therefore good modelization is a real 
challenge for which a careful study of observations is indispensable.
4. The functioning of markets
Any positive economic theory has to represent what the markets perform. 
This representation is not always obvious since markets are abstractions, 
except in a few cases. But our explanation of the phenomena most often 
depends on what is assumed about the functioning of markets. It is there­
fore not surprising that the answers given to two questions, among others, 
appear to be crucial for the theory of macroeconomic policy: do markets 
clear? Do financial markets correctly value the prices of assets?
The majority of economists thinks that cases of non-clearing or incom­
plete clearing are sufficiently important to deserve attention; in particular 
involuntary unemployment really means a lapse from labor market 
clearing, and one that deserves attention. But some economists deny this. 
Similarly, some of us believe that exchange rates between national cur­
rencies, share prices on the stock markets, and even interest rates and the 
prices of some widely traded basic commodities, are subject to speculative 
bubbles and therefore at times deviate from the values that an orderly de­
velopment of real economic activity would require. But other economists 
say that markets are perfectly efficient in transmitting to prices the effects 




























































































The answers given to these two questions are important because they 
lead to different assessments of the effects of exogenous changes, and in 
particular of policy changes. If unemployment can only be frictional, it 
will be little affected, if at all, by an increase in public expenditure or by 
an expansionary monetary policy; if such is the case, all the Keynesian 
theories deal with a different world from ours. If freely operating mar­
kets can be subject to speculative bubbles that perturb the evolution of 
productions and consumptions, stabilization of these markets will perform 
a useful role, whether it is achieved by controls and regulations that are 
not otherwise damaging or by appropriate public interventions that coun­
teract private waves of over or undervaluation.
Hence, the lack of agreement on such questions among professional 
economists shows not only the limits of our objective knowledge of 
macroeconomic phenomena, but also where our research priorities ought 
to be if we want to contribute in a better way to economic policy making. 
As long as we do not agree, much of our advice on macroeconomic poli­
cies will have weak scientific authority and further elaboration of theories 
will have little use in this respect.
Objective answers can only result from reference to facts. But the diffi­
culty of the choice is not only due to data limitations. There is also a 
problem of the alternative hypotheses one has to choose from in order to 
specify the appropriate theory, a theory moreover that has to be ex­
pressed in terms of the main macroeconomic variables. Since I must be 
brief, I shall consider here the market clearing issue only, and limit my 
attention to the labor market. In W. De Bondt and R. Thaler (1989) read­
ers may find references concerning the efficiency of valuation on finan­
cial markets.
Business fluctuations are the main domain of application among those 
for which debates about the labor market clearing question matter. 
Thinking of this domain we may define as follows the two competing hy­
potheses that give different answers to the question:
Ho -  Variations in employment and the wage rate are simultaneously 
explained by variations in the other determinants of the supply of labor 
and demand for it, this supply and demand being constrained to change by 
the same amount.
H i -  Important discrepancies often exist between changes in the supply of 
labor and the demand for it. Variations in employment are explained 
mostly by variations in the determinants of the demand for labor when 
there is an excess supply.
No doubt my formulation could be disputed and I am ready to change it 
to some degree. I believe, however, that two significant features of it are 
appropriate. First, the hypotheses say more than just market clearing or 




























































































restricting attention to the proximate explanations given by a partial 
analysis of the labor market). This feature makes the hypotheses more 
complex and not fully complementary to each other. But since the true 
theoretical choice is between the two packages defined respectively by Ho 
and H i, these packages should be made fully explicit in the specification. 
Second, the definitions refer to variations and changes, thus pointing to 
the intended domain of application and also avoiding the difficulties that 
concern the definition of levels, for the supply of labor and frictional 
unemployment, as well as for the demand for labor and frictional 
vacancies.
Why does the profession of economists find it difficult to decide 
unanimously which of Ho and Hi best fits the available observations? 
Studying this question, particular as it is, helps in understanding the 
problems raised more generally by induction in macroeconomics. Part of 
the answer comes from the fact that, in order to conclude on the basis of 
observations, one needs to introduce additional secondary hypotheses 
whose validity leaves room for discussion. It would be interesting to ex­
amine the actual importance of this remark for each one of the four kinds 
of tests that have played a role in the present instance. But this would have 
to be rather detailed and would obviously lead us too far out of our main 
subject. I shall merely list these four kinds of tests.
First one may ask whether variations in employment can be fully ex­
plained by variations in frictional unemployment. One has then to evalu­
ate successively the effect of each one of the factors that may have acted 
on frictional unemployment and to add up these effects. The difficulty 
then comes both from the possibility that some important factor has not 
been identified and from the inaccuracy of the results of econometric es­
timates used in the evaluation of some effects.
Second one may compare the performance of two alternative macroe- 
conometric modelizations of the labor market, one relying on Ho the 
other on H i. This can be done either for the labor market in isolation or 
within a full model of the economy. Particularly significant in this kind of 
test is the relative variability of the wage rate with respect to that of em­
ployment, a variability that has often been found in fact too small in com­
parison to what Ho would imply. But the result of the test is sensitive to 
the accuracy of a number of econometric estimates, particularly those 
concerning the elasticities with respect to wages of the supply of labor and 
demand for it.
Third one may test whether the behavior of individuals reveals the 
perception of a varying constraint on their supply of labor. This, 
however, requires a full specification of the supply of labor and a careful 
econometric treatment for testing the effect of an indicator of labor mar­
ket tightness. In particular one may wonder whether all determinants of 
the labor supply have been taken into account.
Fourth one may analyze what employers and workers report about 




























































































such a way as to support the idea of large changes in excess supply or 
demand? Reference to this kind of proof is unfamiliar in academic 
econometrics and even macroeconomics; admittedly it has its problems 
also; but we must be aware of its role in public opinion and study much 
more carefully its potentialities for scientific research.
While closing this section, I may say that my own assessment is defi­
nitely more favorable to Hi than to Ho. Although the conclusion of each 
test, belonging to one or the other of the four categories I have consid­
ered, may be challenged, their joint result looks to me definitely 
convincing.
5. An example: assessing the Schumpeterian impact of 
European unification
Clearly limitations of our knowledge have pervading implications 
throughout economics, in particular for policy analysis. In order to look 
at the questions discussed in this lecture from a different angle, it may be 
interesting to consider one issue that arises in the study of the impact of 
1992.
When trying to quantify the impact of the Single European Act, one 
could rely on a method for the various static, once and for all, efficiency 
gains to be expected from trade liberalization. Notwithstanding some 
difficulties in evaluation, it appears that these static gains will remain 
modest (see EC Commission, 1988). Enthusiasm in the business 
community is certainly based on more than that; it is based on the feeling 
that 1992 will promote growth. One, if not the major, reason for believ­
ing in such an effect is the boost given to entrepreneurship. This may be 
called the Schumpeterian impact, since it was Schumpeter who laid so 
much stress on the role of the entrepreneur. We scientists must recognize 
our difficulty in grasping this impact, let alone in quantifying it.
H. Girsch (1987) defined Schumpeterian economics as the “particular 
blend of theoretical and institutional, historical and sociological reasoning 
which Schumpeter combined in judgements of real world issues”. 
Unfortunately in order to make this blend convincing one has to restrict 
its freedom of assertion, hence necessarily also to restrict its scope. It 
seems then that, when turning our attention to the role of entrepreneurs, 
we are led to consider three conditions required for this role to be effec­
tive in promoting growth: a population of potential entrepreneurs, attrac­
tive prospects and a favorable economic environment.
The process initiated by the Single European Act has no effect on popu­
lation, except perhaps in the long run; but we believe it will contribute 
significantly because of the two other conditions. A larger and more inte­
grated market will offer more opportunities in many respects, particu­
larly as regards taking advantage of economies of scale, which are impor­
tant in modem activities at least insofar as research and development are 




























































































economic prospects more optimistic. Simultaneously, as trade and other 
economic activities are liberalized, more scope is given to business incen­
tives; the trend in the general level of profitability is indeterminate be­
cause competition is made more severe, but greater disparities favor those 
that innovate in the right directions.
Such an analysis makes good sense. But it is still impressionistic and 
conjectural. A program aimed at making it more solid should contain 
both basic research, not so easy to delineate, and the gathering of infor­
mation on business perception of the role of the 1992 prospect for 
changes in anticipations and opportunities. (A special survey of this type 
was actually made in 1989 in the European industrial firms; see Study no. 
5 in European Economy, no. 42, November 1989.)
This example shows that important policy issues exist about which the 
profession of economist scientists feels uncomfortable but cannot remain 
silent. The questions are relevant and will be answered one way or 
another by politicians. There is more expertise on the consequences of 
choices in economics than anywhere else, hence the silence of economists 
means decisions would be taken with a poorer information than is really 
available. Since it is thus confronted with the challenge of having to speak 
on issues about which conclusions are still scientifically weak, the 
profession of economists must be guided by ethical norms concerning its 
behavior. This conclusion has an obvious connection with the comment 
made at the end of the first lecture.
III. The European economic system
Twenty years ago it was easy to say that Western European countries had 
chosen to be mixed market economies and that their economic systems 
were serving some broad common objectives. Significant national 
differences existed, giving rise to debates as to what the best organization 
or institution was to be imitated elsewhere for such and such an economic 
or social function. But the importance of these differences seemed to fol­
low a decreasing trend.
The convergence of economic systems within Western Europe, and 
even now more generally within the whole of Europe, is still progressing; 
but the common target towards which these systems are directed does not 
seem to be the same one as in those days; it definitely looks closer to a 
pure capitalist system. Moreover, while ideological oppositions have lost 
most of their strength, one may wonder whether fundamental disagree­
ments do not remain as to what the European system ought to achieve, 
and consequently as to what it ought to be.
This lecture aims at making the options explicit, at presenting some 
factual elements that ought to be taken into account, at tentatively 
proposing some partial answers, and at suggesting some lines of research. 




























































































evolution of the European economic system from the post-war period to 
the present day, though making comments along the way as to the 
implications for the future (section 1), then looking forward to the 
challenges involved in preparation for the next century (section 2). We 
shall then be ready to discuss what kind of market economy Europe 
should have (section 3). Since this economy will in any case be less regu­
lated than that of the last few decades and will operate in a somewhat dif­
ferent international environment, one might wonder what role macroeco­
nomic policies might play. I shall say a few words about this in a short fi­
nal section. During this and the next lecture I shall of course at times ex­
press personal views. I hope I shall do so with moderation and make it 
clear when these views are not widely shared in the profession.
1. Overview of past evolution
It is convenient to distinguish two periods since the last world war. The 
first, which lasted roughly thirty years, was a time of confidence in a Eu­
ropean kind of mixed economy that gave the main role to markets in the 
allocation of resources though with some coordination and stabilization by 
governments, an economy moreover that covered people against major 
risks, avoided extreme inequalities and insured everybody a minimum 
standard of living. While the actual role of government was not the same 
everywhere and also changed through time, the progress of the welfare 
state was manifest throughout this period. But the last fifteen years, 
marked by the loss of European competitiveness which occurred in the 
late ’70s, have seen a different evolution with a retreat of government 
from new grounds left to market forces and with a reversal of the trend 
in inequalities.
It seems to me that for the purpose of this lecture two questions should 
be addressed. What are the reasons for the decrease in the role of gov­
ernment? To what extent was the loss of European competitiveness due to 
the economic system we had when it occurred? In identifying responsi­
bilities answers to these questions will contribute to our understanding of 
the problems we are now facing. Let us consider them in turn.
The role of government, as seen in the mid-1960s, was not only to act 
by clever demand management so as to stabilize short term evolution; it 
was also to care about longer term economic objectives. The reasons for 
the decrease in confidence given to stabilization by demand management 
are more easily identified than those concerning medium term economic 
policies. I shall indeed talk mainly of the first ones.
(a) As we have already seen in the first lecture, the evolution of our ideas 
about macroeconomic phenomena made us less confident in demand 
management, because at times supply conditions matter more than the 
level of demand and because the medium-term trade-off between inflation 




























































































earlier thought. One may now add that since 1990 budget deficits, often 
associated with such policies, have also become a constraint because the 
level of real interest rates makes large deficits impossible to sustain for 
too long. While it is hard to believe that real interest rates will not 
decrease somewhat, one should not expect them to be again at the low 
levels they reached in most European countries during the ’60s and ’70s. 
Hence, consideration of public debts will remain as a second reason, 
together with concern about price expectations and inflation for 
maintaining a cautious attitude with respect to active expansionary 
policies.
If decisions shift from the national to the European level, a third reason 
explaining why the attitude has become less favorable to demand 
stimulation will on the contrary be removed. Indeed, national policies 
have become less and less effective as economies become more open to 
international trade. But the Common Market as a whole is much more 
similar to a closed economy in its macroeconomic behavior than any 
single European country may be. This was convincingly argued in J. 
Draze et al. (1987) who pointed in particular to the rather small import 
share in GDP for the Community of 10 members taken as a whole (13.4 
per cent, as against 25-30 per cent for large individual countries).
Moreover, it was found that demand management was not so easy to 
monitor. In England in particular it led to alternating decisions of stop 
and go in a way that failed to stabilize the economy. In France in 1975 
and again in 1982 strong expansionary policies were disappointing 
because they induced larger foreign deficits than were expected (for 
reasons perhaps as yet imperfectly known), and a sharp turn to restrictive 
policies was taken about a year later in both cases.
The case of West Germany deserves particular attention here since it is 
different from those of the United Kingdom and the United States with 
which many writers are much better acquainted. Throughout the period 
1982-86 when a large slack in business conditions prevailed, German 
authorities stubbornly resisted the very frequent request from abroad and 
from trade-unions to inflate their aggregate demand. They could not 
claim balance of payments difficulties since their current account had a 
surplus, even an increasing one (0.5 per cent of GDP in 1982, 4.4 per 
cent in 1986, 5.3 per cent in 1989). They argued to be obliged to restore 
their public finances; but the argument in itself was hardly convincing 
since the public debt remained moderate (39 per cent of GDP in 1982, 43 
per cent in 1986, now declining).
Part of the real explanation is the heavy weight given to price stability 
in the German objective function. Already in the ’60s, while Keynesian 
economics was the most widely accepted wisdom in the country as 
elsewhere, real interest rates remained at a safe level of roughly 3 per 
cent, definitely above what could be seen abroad. But a significant part of 
the explanation is also the perception by almost all German economists 




























































































difficult business conditions than otherwise. It was in Germany that real 
wages first appeared too high (already in the early ’70s) and it was in 
Germany that the notion of Eurosclerosis was invented. This perception 
was, I believe, reinforced by a reaction to what seems to me to have been 
a collective irrationality in 1980. Answering with some reluctance to 
international solicitations, the German government in 1978 had accepted 
to play the role of the locomotive and to have an expansionary policy. 
With hindsight, the move does not appear to have been so bad for 
Germany since the unemployment rate for instance decreased from 4.0 
per cent in 1977 to 3.3 in 1980 (as against an increase in France from 5.1 
to 6.4 per cent for the same years). But the ensuing deficit of the current 
account (which bottomed at -1.7 per cent of GDP in 1980) was considered 
both as totally intolerable and as a new sign of the loss of German com­
petitiveness that had already been talked about. The conclusion commonly 
drawn in the country was that the same policy should not be tried again. 
Some serious economists even put forward the paradoxical, and hardly 
credible, thesis according to which fiscal contradiction was the right thing 
to do in order to stimulate overall demand (M. Hellwig and M. Neumann, 
1987). This story well shows, I believe, how the loss of confidence in ac­
tive macroeconomic policy was due to a combination of changes occur­
ring in both the assessment by experts and public opinion; these same 
changes occurred in other countries as well.
(b) This loss of confidence was not limited to short term stabilization; it 
extended to medium term policies and most kinds of government inter­
vention in the economy. My past connections with French planning make 
it my duty to consider here this longer time perspective also. The case of 
French planning is, of course, special, particularly because at one time it 
was overpraised, which led to disillusion, and hence underrating. One 
should note nevertheless the more widely significant fact that the formal 
apparatus so active twenty five years ago in discussing French medium- 
term policies has been made much lighter and now attracts only very little 
interest.
The explanation is probably almost the same as for stabilization 
policies: economies that are more open cannot easily be controlled. Since 
it now appears that no simple recipe exists for solving medium term 
problems, in particular lasting unemployment, public opinion and many 
politicians tend to think there is nothing significant to do about them. This 
assertion, which I presented more fully in E. Malinvaud (1984), is less 
cynical than the one made by R. Solow (1987) who said that the 
conservative governments, which now rule in most countries, “do not 
really care much about macroeconomic performance”, although I agree 
with him in thinking today that the electorate itself cares less about 
macro- performance than we earlier believed.
To tell the truth, I see here with nostalgia the present neglect of 




























































































planning was claimed to do in market economies: the elaboration and 
diffusion of sound ideas on medium-term economic trends and on their 
implications, the discussion of programmes for public services and the 
explicit choice of policies in such matters as education, social security, 
environment, energy, agriculture and the like, even including the 
disreputable industrial and trade policies whose existence is a fact of life 
and may in some cases be justified. I believe that on the whole French 
planning played a useful role in past decades because it made decisions 
more lucid, although far from as lucid as I would have wished.
In a fuller account of the changes witnessed during the past two 
decades, one should also consider the deregulation and privatization 
movement. Many people were once led to realize that public interventions 
intended to correct “market failures” were exposed to “government 
failures” of various kinds; with the swing of ideas these latter failures 
often appeared to outweigh the former ones.
(c) In comparison with the rest of the industrialized world, the European 
Community experienced a sharper reduction in output growth and a large 
increase in unemployment during the ’70s and early ’80s. This was 
symptomatic of an underlying competitiveness problem. In several 
countries policy-makers were unable to stimulate aggregate demand 
without causing an unacceptable deterioration in the current account. 
Moreover we know that this was not due to a real appreciation of 
European currencies: there were large fluctuations, but no significant 
trend in the real exchange rates.
It has been argued that the loss of competitiveness by Europe was due 
to the evolution of its economic system. The development of the welfare 
state and the increase in regulations had led to a rigidification and to a 
significant weakening of economic incentives; this was Eurosclerosis. A 
contrario deregulation and removal of at least some of the institutions of 
the welfare state was said to be necessary for a recovery of European 
growth.
The argument needs to be looked at closely and in detail. I hope that 
research will be done on it in the years to come, so as to detect what the 
effects induced by each regulation and each aspect of the welfare state 
have been and how important these effects may have been. I cannot 
prejudge what the precise result of this research will be and I know that it 
is not going to be easy. But what is now available tends to suggest that 
responsibility for each effect will be found to have been very small, 
because the relevant elasticities are small (e.g. elasticity of the demand for 
labor with respect to the ratio between the minimum and the average 
wage) and because the evolution of the economic system has been slow 
(e.g. the change of the ratio has been small).
Moreover, there is an alternative explanation for the loss of European 




























































































that has only weak implications on what the European economic system 
ought to be in the future. The explanation may be given as follows.
A long period of rapid European growth from the end of the war to 
1973 raised expectations about what was feasible. Progressively most 
people came to expect that each year a significant new increase in their 
purchasing power would occur. These expectations raised aspirations and 
strongly conditioned wage setting. European workers and businessmen 
then did not realize that several factors made it unlikely that the rate of 
growth of real incomes in the ’60s could long be maintained: it was partly 
due to a catch-up with respect to the fundamental European potential after 
the slow-down of the ’30s and ’40s but this catch-up was coming to an 
end; stability in the world economy could not be taken for granted and 
instability would imply slower growth; neither could the then favorable 
evolution of the terms of trade be taken for granted; Japan and the newly 
industrialized countries had been buyers of European equipment goods, 
but they were progressively becoming important competitors and the new 
international division of labor that was going to emerge would require 
important restructuring of our industries and less favorable export prices. 
All these risks, which could have been anticipated but were not, material­
ized in the ’70s and early ’80s. But expectations and aspirations were very 
slow in adapting to the new situation. At the same time a social malaise 
that had developed during the years of affluence de facto weakened the 
bargaining position of employers. For these various reasons real wages 
went on increasing and profitability deteriorated so much that business­
men had neither the incentive nor the possibility to keep pace with inter­
national competition.
Clearly this explanation gives responsibility to an extraordinary histori­
cal conjunction, within which the rigidities of the economic system only 
play an ancillary role.
2. Challenges of the future
Looking ahead now, what are the main challenges the European economy 
will have to face in the years and decades to come? Leaving aside for the 
moment the specific challenge of European unification which I shall con­
sider in the fourth lecture, I may list: how to insure the revival of Euro­
pean competitiveness; how to help Eastern European economies to 
recover; how to reach a proper fit between the European social 
philosophy and the requirements of market efficiency; and how to solve 
the problems resulting from the change in the European demographic 
structure. I could add other items to this list, for instance environmental 
problems as a fifth challenge; but considering them would not lead me to 
revise significantly the implications I shall draw as regards the European 
economic system.
We need not fully study the answers to be given to the four above 




























































































available. It will be sufficient primarily to get an idea of what the gist of 
the answer ought to be in each case and therefore to grasp the implica­
tions for the choice of the appropriate European economic system. 
Neither will it be necessary to consider a wide range of possibilities for 
this system. We know already that the main role will be given to markets 
for the allocation of resources; the crux of the matter is to know the exact 
extent of this role and how it ought to be complemented, if at all.
(a) One cannot doubt that today the assessment of current European 
competitiveness is much more favorable than it was five years ago. The 
decline in European market shares seems to have stopped. Our current 
balance remains in equilibrium, notwithstanding the fact that demand is 
now increasing faster in Europe than elsewhere. (Of course the imbalance 
within the Community is a problem, but one that does not concern us at 
this point.) Productive investments are booming and capacities are 
expanding, particularly in the most promising industries, in which they 
had been previously lagging in comparison with what was happening 
elsewhere in the world. One may well speak then, as some commentators 
do, of a revival of our competitiveness.If so, no particular change of our 
system would be required on this score.
Caution is, however, wise. First, the good news is still recent and based 
on statistics that are not complete since some of them, like volume market 
shares, are gathered with a long lag; perhaps we are overoptimistic today 
as to the present stand. Second, convalescence may be exposed to renewed 
attack if the evolution of the world economy turns out to be unfavorable 
to our region; the recent sharp decrease in the exchange rate of the yen 
may be a case in point since, if it is maintained, it will again give an 
advantage to Japanese competition. Third, within the world context the 
process of European unification may very well result in a situation by 
which Europe will be more open to foreign competition than any other 
major region, which means that here specialization will have to be that 
much sharper and profit margins in growing activities to be that much 
more attractive.
These considerations point to the existence of a trade-off between the 
degree of openness of the European economy, which may of course be 
stimulating for business and therefore favorable to growth, and the 
fulfilment of social objectives, which may recommend moderation in the 
speed of industrial restructuring as well as in the acceptance of large 
profit margins where competition permits.
(b) Western Europe now feels that it has a responsibility for helping to 
raise standards of living in Eastern Europe. What will happen there is of 
course still largely indeterminate. But in order to understand the nature 
of the challenge for us, we may focus attention on two scenarios relating 
to what the situation may be in the year 2000, assuming in both cases a 




























































































According to scenario 1 we would witness a rapid reconstruction of 
competitive economies in Eastern Europe, a reconstruction similar to the 
one that occurred in Western Europe after the war. The reconstruction 
now concerns economies that are less wrecked but have lived longer with 
a low productivity. The differences probably matter less than two other 
factors: the existence of a human potential whose motivation and qualifi­
cation should be good, and the great geographical and cultural proximity 
with the prosperous sister economy. One can well imagine that growth in 
this scenario of “competitive reconstruction” will be even faster than it 
was in Western Europe forty years ago. But I believe there is one condi­
tion, namely that the economy in question be indeed competitive, which 
means in particular that it will be able to face competition from 
elsewhere, hence that its (temporary) backwardness will be outweighed by 
lower costs in international money.
According to scenario 2 a part of Eastern Europe would be assisted by 
Western Europe, in the same way that southern Italy is, or the French 
Départements d’Outremer are. The rest of Eastern Europe would remain 
outside this integrated area; its exact state does not need to be made 
precise in this discussion. Needless to say, the real levels of consumption 
in the year 2000 would be lower in this scenario than in the previous one, 
within the assisted part of Eastern Europe.
I believe that the scenario of competitive reconstruction is now the most 
likely one. But the risk of falling into scenario 2 does not appear 
negligible, when we think for instance about possible sequences of events 
shaping German unification. It is up to economists to make this risk per­
fectly explicit and to bring it to the attention of as large a number of 
people as possible. We must realize that for politicians the easiest deci­
sions may be precisely those leading to the scenario of assistance.
One implication of scenario 1 is that the faster reconstruction is in 
Eastern Europe, the faster restructuring will have to be in Western Eu­
rope. In our region high technology industries will benefit from a larger 
and quickly increasing demand, but traditional industries will be exposed 
to more and more competition. This again raises the question of the 
appropriate degree of openness of the European Community.
(c) There is an obvious clash between the institution of a full modem 
capitalist system and the central social philosophy to which Europe has 
adhered during this century, a philosophy stressing that the economy is 
for the service of people, accepting the notion of a social welfare that 
values equality of conditions as well as protection against risks, and giving 
to the State the function of guaranteeing this social welfare. While 
deregulation and privatization have progressed, while the notion that 
enterprise is valuable has been restored with all its implications, there is 
also evidence that people are still attached to the same social philosophy 




























































































confidently forecast that this clash will create problems. Let us look at it a 
little more closely.
Clearly, the increase in inequalities has been accepted thus far. It has 
been accepted because it has been understood to be unavoidable in a 
difficult period. Mass unemployment generates inequalities. But in order 
to reduce unemployment one has had to accept the restoration of profits 
and of all the financial incentives that stimulate growth; these are quite 
unevenly distributed. Moreover the high level of real interest rates was a 
world phenomenon that nobody could avoid.
One may wonder whether present attitudes do not also reveal something 
that will be more permanent. The institutions of the welfare state have 
done a lot towards equalizing conditions and reducing poverty. Many 
people now seem to think that this had a cost in terms of growth and was 
nevertheless less effective in reducing true inequalities than we expected. 
In other words, the trade-off between growth and equality is now 
believed to be more severe than many thought before. It is natural then 
that the median voter has revised his views on what ought to be done and 
now selects a policy mix less conducive to redistribution.
But this qualification concerning some consequences commonly drawn 
from European social philosophy should not lead us to minimize the risk 
of political clash if present trends are maintained. For instance taxation of 
capital incomes and capital gains is now substantially reduced. One 
understands why. The liberalization of capital movements forbids signifi­
cant differences in taxation across countries, unless the owner’s country 
of residence is the reference and tax authorities have the relevant infor­
mation; but this last condition is not easily met; harmonization is 
politically all the more smooth as it is done at the lowest of existing 
taxation levels; and that there are tax havens. Notwithstanding these good 
reasons, I do think that there is a serious problem here that economists in 
Europe should face, so as to inform public opinion on what a satisfactory 
solution could be.
The future of the social security system is another problem, because we 
realize now that, as they have been patterned, these systems are not fi­
nancially sustainable in the long run unless rates of contribution continue 
increasing. But people want both present benefits to be maintained and 
rates of contribution to stop increasing. Similarly, the various protections 
that labor laws and regulations now grant to workers will not be easily 
reduced, even if they are said to cause rigidities.
(d) European demographic trends are potentially the.source of two main 
challenges, one related to the geopolitical problem of a stable and even 
declining population with more and more populous and less rich neigh­
bours, and the other to the implications of having an ageing population. 
Economists have little to contribute to geopolitics; so I shall consider here 




























































































Like many demographic trends, the ageing of the European population 
is going to be a slow but persistent problem. For instance in EC-12 the 
ratio of the number of people aged 65 or more over that of people aged 
from 15 to 64 went up from 14 per cent in 1950 to 21 per cent in 1990 
and is forecast to be 35 per cent in 2030 (OECD demographic projections 
-  medium fertility hypothesis). This phenomenon seems to have two main 
implications. On the one hand one fears that the workforce will pro­
gressively exhibit less dynamism, lose part of its entrepreneurial spirit 
and less willingly take risks; this may mean a competitive disadvantage, 
not so much with respect to the US and Japan that will experience a 
similar ageing, but with respect to younger competitors. On the other, 
unless retirement ages increase or the level of pensions relative to average 
income decreases again and again in the future, the working population 
will have to bear a higher cost for sustaining elderly people; it is already 
clear that some social security pension schemes will experience great fi­
nancial difficulties.
3. What kind of a market system?
Europe wants to enjoy the benefits of a free market economy but does not 
want to forsake its social philosophy. I have already pointed to some 
consequences that this fact, as well as some other challenges, will have on 
the European economic system. Let me repeat and somewhat complement.
First, our fiscal system (including social security contributions of 
course) has to be reviewed. Its allocative and redistributive functions have 
to be reassessed, so that its logic is made clear. It seems to me that no 
satisfactory system will be found without some substantial taxation of 
capital.
Second, what has already been done in reviewing our social security 
systems and their future problems shows that the natural tendency of 
some benefits to continue increasing will have to be contained. The 
solution needs not be the same in all countries of the Community; but two 
of its features will probably have to apply everywhere. The mandatory 
part of risk-sharing will contract somewhat, so that the role of private 
insurance increases. Some of the rules for entitlement to public benefits 
will be made more severe; in particular the retirement age opening a 
right to a public pension will have to increase again (although more care­
ful in its statement, the official document OECD (1988) comes close to 
these conclusions). European unification moreover requires that labor 
mobility is not hindered by the fact that moving would imply losses in ac­
cumulated social security rights; particular attention ought to concern 
unemployment insurance and pensions, which should be made fully 
portable from one country to another (on this see J.-P. Danthine et al., 
1990).
Let us now look at the various kinds of markets. Although goods 




























































































remain for public intervention, and not only because of the provision of 
collective goods and the control of externalities, particularly concerning 
the environment. I have already mentioned trade policies vis-à-vis the 
outside world. Their main objective will be free trade, and hopefully the 
full opening of borders to goods produced in underdeveloped countries; 
but the requirement of a real reciprocity with developed countries is 
likely to justify the persistence of some restrictions since the Community 
will in any case have serious adaptation problems. For helping in the 
solution of these problems, public aids to restructuring and even public 
assistance may have to be quite significant.
Internal and external market competitiveness of the economy will raise 
dilemmas. On the one hand efficient production often requires large size, 
so that in some activities the concentration of European firms has still to 
progress. On the other hand, efficiency also requires that no firm or 
group of colluding firms can behave like a monopolist. Clearly, in order 
to best face this dilemma public authorities will have both to follow legal 
rules and to study all the features of each particular case. This means that 
industrial structures will be somewhat different from those that would be 
implied by a laissez-faire policy.
Public support for research and developement will remain important. It 
cannot be truly indiscriminate and is necessarily inspired by some notions 
on what the promising lines of technological innovation may be. Similar 
notions are necessary for a proper conception of the aids to restructuring 
operations. Hence I believe it would be proper if the Community’s 
industrial policy, so understood, could be elaborated not only by the 
administration of the Commission and by the political authorities but also 
within an institution that would be somewhat more independent, less 
pressed by current decision taking and wide open to discussion with all 
experts and all partners. You understand that I am referring here to 
something similar to what French planning once was and to the concep­
tion we owe to Jean Monnet.
It is difficult to describe in a few words what an actual labor market 
can be, since the textbook notion of an ideal market is in this case a par­
ticularly severe approximation. But clearly, future European labor mar­
kets will not be much different from what they are now. Progressively, 
however, they will become more similar across countries, since the aim is 
that labor movements react to economic incentives, and only to those: 
labor laws and regulations will then have to be made more homogeneous. 
Should we recommend that this evolution be made at the highest speed 
that is socially acceptable?
Let us note first that perfect integration of labor markets does not mean 
that workers’ mobility would necessarily be high, since linguistic and 
cultural barriers will remain over and above impediments that are already 
effective within each country, such as the imperfections of the housing 
market. Let us note also that, according to the theory of the allocation of 




























































































gain from labor mobility, except for highly qualified or narrowly 
specialized labor that is not everywhere to be found. But this conclusion 
assumes “perfect” labor market and neglects the type of macroeconomic 
consequences that actual labor market functioning entails.
The modem theory of corporatism, as discussed for instance by L. 
Calmfors and J. Driffill (1988), shows how these consequences may 
depend on the structure of labor markets. In particular the two authors 
study the level at which wage bargaining occurs: from the most 
centralized case of a unique grand bargaining to the most decentralized 
one operating within narrowly defined industries or even within firms. 
They show that either of the two extremes leads to better macroeconomic 
results than the intermediate case of incompletely centralized bargaining 
between fairly large unions and representatives of employers of large in­
dustries: in the decentralized case unions and industries have too little 
monopoly power to deviate much from competitive behavior; in the fully 
centralized case bargaining efficiently internalizes all the macroeconomic 
consequences of the decisions. Taking this modelization as a reference. J.- 
P. Danthine et al. (1990) have argued that at least for many years to come 
European unification will make the fully centralized case unfeasible; for 
the intermediate cases, moreover, integration of goods and capital 
markets will quite significantly reduce the macroeconomic losses, already 
without any mobility of labor.
This analysis is of course special. Qualitatively different conclusions 
will perhaps be found if other factors are seriously studied. In particular 
the transmission of skills that follows from mobility may lead to 
significant productivity gains. All in all, however, it seems that forcing 
social resistance to harmonization of labor laws and regulations so as to 
quickly reach a full integration of markets for all kinds of labor may not 
be wise. Evolution of national systems is advisable on its own, in order to 
restore some flexibility where markets have been made excessively rigid. 
This should be done in such a way as to contribute to convergence. But 
again I explained at the end of section 1 that in my view the role of 
rigidities in our past difficulties was sometimes overstressed and in sec­
tion 2 that labor legislation was one of the main potential focuses for the 
clash between the restoration of a purer capitalism and the persistence of 
the European social philosophy.
Free movements of capital within the Community was decided and is 
already close to fully hold. We may assume that it will remain a perma­
nent feature of the European capital market, although the possibility of 
crises imposing temporary controls ought perhaps not to be excluded. In 
practice full capital mobility within the EEC boundaries is also very 
likely to forbid restrictions of capital movements with the rest of the 
world, since the capital markets of the major countries are already quite 
integrated with one another. Imposing new controls would disrupt many 
regular contractual relations and is probably not even feasible because 




























































































financial system experiences phases of great turbulence, it will be found 
appropriate to impose transaction costs through the boundaries of the 
main financial areas in order to dampen hot money flows.
Although very free, these capital markets will not escape some forms of 
government intervention. I mentioned the taxation of capital incomes and 
gains as one such form. A monetary authority will also obviously remain 
necessary, not only for macroeconomic stabilization but also as a “lender 
of last resort” so as to insure a sufficient solvency of the credit system. 
Prudential regulations will contribute to the same objective, while other 
regulations will aim at an equitable functioning of financial markets.
A particularly delicate issue concerns the purpose of the regulation of 
takeovers and other forms of corporate restructuring through capital 
markets. There are two opposite conceptions in this respect, naturally 
with possibilities of compromises in between. Some people focus their at­
tention on the interest of shareholders, viewed as investors in securities. 
They want markets in which small investors have equal access to infor­
mation with dominant shareholders, are protected from exploitation and 
may benefit by all kinds of profitable offers that takeover bids may in­
duce. The regulation of securities markets and takeovers in the US and the 
UK corresponds to this first conception. Other people see large corpora­
tions as productive associations built through time by their workers, man­
agers, lenders and shareholders, associations that even have a kind of vo­
cation for particular activities. For these people the transfer of control 
has to take account of the explicit or implicit rights of workers, managers 
and supporting banks; so the enterprise itself has to be protected against 
predatory attacks. This conception agrees with the methods of corporate 
restructuring traditionally applied in Germany or Japan.
Although present trends are inspired mainly by the first conception, it 
is far from obvious that it is welcome. J. Franks and C. Mayer (1990) 
well show that two conflicting considerations arise when we compare the 
efficiency achieved by the corporate sector. On the one hand high expo­
sure to takeovers is often said to impose high managerial performance. 
On the other hand the efficiency of a large corporation depends on the 
confidence with which each of its agents (workers, managers, lenders, 
shareholders, even customers) perceives the involvement of the others in 
a durable common activity ruled by more or less implicit contracts. This 
confidence is jeopardized if the risk of a disrupting takeover can material­
ize at any time. Neither logic nor experience shows the second considera­
tion to be less important than the first one. Thinking about the deficien­
cies of stock markets in evaluating the long term profitability of firms, I 
tend to believe that the second consideration should be predominant as the 
Community is going to decide on its regulation of corporate restructur­
ings.
One conclusion seems to emerge at the end of this survey. Looking at 
the main aspects of the future European economic system, we have seen 




























































































choice certainly not to be regretted, cannot neglect a number of side 
conditions whose fulfilment will depend in part on the existence of proper 
institutional rules and of wise government.
4. The role of macroeconomic policies
I may be very brief on what macroeconomic policies will still have to do 
in the European economic system. Indeed, we have the example of the US 
with its large internal market and a system that has a good degree of simi­
larity with the one toward which the Community is heading. With this ex­
ample in front of us we know that the need for macroeconomic stabiliza­
tion will remain. We also know that the Community, although open, will 
be sufficiently self-supporting for independent macroeconomic policies to 
have more domestic impact than is the case now for each one of our 
countries. (In 1985 the import share in GDP was 13.4 per cent for the 
aggregated Community of ten members, as against 10.1 per cent for the 
US, figures given by J. Draze et al., 1987.) At this point I would simply 
add two comments to what I said in the first lecture and at the beginning 
of this one, to what I shall say in the next lecture and to what anyone can 
otherwise infer from the American case.
Firstly the liberalization of capital movements in Europe applies with 
respect to other parts of the world also, thus contributing to the trend to­
ward full financial integration of the developed countries. There is a risk 
that the world capital markets so created experience important crises in 
the future.
Economic history provides us with quite a few instances of financial 
crises that had major impacts on the real economy. These crises became 
particularly severe when they generated a chain reaction which destroyed 
the solvency of many financial institutions and even non-financial corpo­
rations. Control on the banking system and on the markets by active cen­
tral banks reduced the frequency of such crises and alleviated their conse­
quences, particularly so after the diffusion of Keynesian theories and their 
successors which gave problematic guides to central bankers.
It would be an exaggeration to say that today the world capital markets 
are not controlled at all because there is no world central bank. Indeed, 
national central banks do not consider their responsibility as being limited 
to their domestic markets and intervene when the international situation 
requires it, often acting simultaneously in a coordinated way. Major fi­
nancial crises were thus avoided, first when it suddenly appeared in 1982 
that Latin America had huge debt problems, second at the time of the 
1987 stock exchange crash. But nobody can say whether such counterac­
tion will always be feasible since a financial crisis can have many origins, 
since it can involve sudden capital movements of a very large size, while 
most actions of central banks have to be indirect, and since the develop­
ment of elaborate financial superstructures and imaginative operations in­




























































































curs, one knows that it will be particularly hard on those that are highly 
indebted, as well as on those whose solvency depends on the solvency of 
the former.
Because of this risk I do believe that macroeconomic policies, as well as 
microeconomic banking regulations, should maintain a permanent con­
cern about the indebtedness of the main categories of agents. This being 
said, I must recognize that for the purpose we do not seem to have the 
theoretical framework, which would guide us, and the methodology, 
which we would routinely apply. Trying to build the framework and the 
methodology looks to me to be an important objective for macroeconomic 
research nowadays. I hope it will attract interest. I note that such research 
would need to deal with a broad range of issues, so that it would encom­
pass in particular the effect of public debts on appropriate government 
policy, an effect that is now worth studying for reasons I mentioned at the 
beginning. Secondly, we must keep in mind that modem market 
economies, even when well managed by wise monetary and fiscal policies, 
have a spontaneous tendency to drift toward inflation, first slowly then at 
an accelerating pace unless unemployment is substantial, more substantial 
than is admissible. This outcome results from price and wage formation, 
and more precisely from the way it normally operates in our times. In 
order to cope with the difficulty, the government then has to interfere,
i.e. to have a prices and incomes policy.
In the past this kind of policy often turned out to be deceptive. Some­
times government action simply did not succeed in having any impact on 
the formation of wages and prices. In other cases the impact was purely 
temporary, for instance when, shortly after the end of a price and/or 
wage freeze, the price level was back on its former trend. When govern­
ment action had a durable effect it was usually smaller than had been in­
tended. Unpleasant as it is, this experience nevertheless shows that price 
and income policies can be effective, in particular when wage bargaining 
is centralized, or else when there is a good public consensus on economic 
issues and when the current situation of the country is understood to rec­
ommend moderation of nominal claims.
Heterogeneity of the Community will, for many years to come, be a 
handicap for the success of any kind of deliberate common price and in­
come policy. On the other hand it is difficult to imagine that price and 
wage formation will everywhere and always conform with what is done 
in the least inflation-prone countries. The discipline that seems to be im­
posed at present within EMS is unlikely to persist for ever; indeed it is 
still imperfect now. Prices and incomes policies at the national level may 
then prove to be insufficient.
I must therefore draw the uncomfortable conclusion that macroe­
conomists have no recommendation to make to politicians on this delicate 
issue, except to tell them they should not expect to achieve much by ac­
tions intended to curb directly the spontaneous formation of wages and 




























































































might usefully approach the issue. Let us hope that others will be more 
helpful, perhaps sociologists or economists knowledgeable in labor 
relations.
IV. The economic challenge of European 
unification
European unity appears more and more as a widely shared objective for 
the people of our countries. The march toward it has had to go through 
many stages since the Treaty of Rome; its end is still a good distance 
ahead, although it now progresses at an accelerated pace. Completing this 
march in good order is certainly a challenge. In this lecture I shall at­
tempt to consider the economic obstacles along the way and discuss how 
we might best surmount them, or at least try to present the issues that 
ought to be resolved.
My first group of comments will aim to assess where we are in the 
present phase of transition and to look ahead to the difficulties of the next 
achievements (section 1). The second group will concern the question of 
knowing how homogeneous the common economy we want to build ought 
to be; an answer to this question should provide useful orientation for the 
policy choices we now have to make (section 2). The rest of the lecture 
will be more specifically macroeconomic and devoted to the two main 
problems for which lucid and realistic macroeconomic strategies have to 
be chosen: how to manage the transition to full monetary union (section 
3), and how to coordinate fiscal policies (section 4).
1. Some dynamic aspects of the transition
In order to grasp properly the problems marking the road to European 
economic unity, it may be necessary to reflect on the various aspects of 
the dynamic process during the transition. This process is guided by the 
political will to achieve unification and to overcome all kinds of 
difficulty. The objective is clear, but the best way to reach it is not, since 
we must go around obstacles that are too big to be directly surmounted. 
In fact many unknown variables exist when decisions are taken and 
reforms introduced; inevitably some of the initiatives will later on appear 
to have been more or less inappropriate, perhaps even to the extent that 
we have run down blind alleys. These uncertainties are explained well in 
chapter 5 of J. Palmer (1989), a chapter suggestively entitled “Will it 
Happen?”
One may then view the process as moving ahead in the midst of 
hundreds of obstacles, of various sizes, that slow it down, force it to de­
viate, even at places impose a retreat. But the strength of the process is 
also permanently regenerated by the sense of momentum and change that 




























































































potential of the single market drive the energies and are fuelled by the 
evidence that many stmctural changes do occur.
In the macroeconomic field as in others it may be easier for a specialist 
to identify and study precisely the obstacles than to do the same for the 
driving force. We are certainly witnessing an investment boom which is 
no doubt partly due to the 1992 prospect; but, as I hinted at the end of the 
second lecture, we find it very difficult to closely analyze and forecast the 
“Schumpeterian impact” of this prospect.
This remark should be borne in mind as I now draw attention to some 
macroeconomic imbalances appearing along the way, the presupposition 
being that macroeconomic difficulties of the transition period should take 
the form of unsustainable evolutions.
I shall argue in a moment that full homogeneity in the Community will 
be neither feasible nor required. Hence, one ought not to expect nor even 
wish perfect similarity in macroeconomic evolutions. For the same reason 
the lack of convergence of some of these evolutions during the transition 
period does not necessarily reveal difficulties. It does, however, signal an 
issue requiring serious scrutiny, because it may also show that something 
wrong is developing, something that will grow worse through time. The 
Commission is well aware of it since one of its recent reports to the 
Council of Ministers has the title: “Economic convergence in the 
Community: an increased effort is necessary” (European Economy, No. 
41, July 1989). With this in mind I shall now briefly recall the nature of 
the present trends, taking as a reference the beginning of 1987 as growth 
was resuming, inflation had come down to an annual rate below 5 per 
cent (EC-12) and the last realignment within EMS had taken place.
Since that time progress has been made toward a further convergence 
of inflation rates within EMS, but hardly within the whole Community. If 
we except Greece (15 per cent) and Portugal (12 per cent), the spread of 
annual inflation rates for 1990 is still expected to go from between 2 and 
3 per cent in four countries to more than 6 per cent in three countries, 
two of which belonging to EMS. An annual spread of the order of 4 per 
cent would clearly be quickly unsustainable in a monetary union. I shall 
come back to this question seriously in section 3.
While for the Community as a whole the unemployment rate has 
decreased by almost 2 per cent during the last three years, there has also 
been some convergence because the decrease has been particularly fast in 
two countries that experienced high unemployment, Spain and the UK. 
The dispersion is still important however with three countries reporting 
rates below 6 per cent and two countries’ rates about 16 per cent. Not 
surprisingly considering this slow convergence, one notes a negative 
correlation between rates of real growth and rates of unemployment. It 
thus appears that so far, at the country level, the process to 1992 operates 
better than expected by those who feared it would be more favorable to 
the already most prosperous regions; as far as I know, observation at 




























































































As attention is drawn to regional disparities in unemployment and 
growth rates, it is proper to recall that at the time of the Treaty of Rome 
fears were also expressed that the Common Market would benefit the 
most industrialized regions of the Community at the expense of other re­
gions. On the whole these fears have turned out to be misplaced. Unfortu­
nately since that time the macroeconomics of comparative regional devel­
opment has not become significantly more operational for policy makers. 
For reasons similar to those explaining our difficulties in measuring the 
Schumpeterian impact of 1992, we are unable today to detect where the 
main beneficiaries of the internal market will be. We are thus unable to 
identify the location of the most urgent needs for the Community struc­
tural funds which are aimed at reallocating resources to regions whose 
spontaneous development would lag behind. Considering these uncertain­
ties a good case can also be made for the automatic redistribution that 
would result if a Community element was introduced into unemployment 
insurance. (After some earlier similar proposals C. Bean et al. (1990) ar­
gued for it).
If we mm our attention back again toward present trends, we find that 
two immediate and more troublesome problems will have to be taken into 
account here, in sections 3 and 4, namely the increasing imbalance in the 
external accounts of the various countries and the diverging evolution of 
public debts. The disturbing evolution of the current account balances ap­
pears clearly with the increasing sizes of surpluses and deficits. For in­
stance between 1987 and 1989 the German surplus in percent of GDP in­
creased from 3.9 to 5.3, the British deficit, again in percent of GDP, in­
creased from 1.6 to 4.1 and the Spanish deficit from 0 to 2.9. While it is 
natural for some countries to finance the development of others, as for 
West Germany to finance Spanish expansion, the present evolution is 
obviously also due to some other factors, which may reveal difficulties 
for the transition period.
Divergence in the evolution of public debts is striking too. In five 
countries of the Community the ratio of the public debt to GDP follows a 
significantly increasing trend. These countries all belong to the group of 
six in which the ratio already exceeds 70 per cent, the exception being 
Ireland which has succeeded in obtaining a decrease in the very heavy 
burden of its debt. However, the divergent evolution of public debts has a 
fairly obvious explanation that has nothing to do with the process of 
economic unification. Since the sharp increase in real interest rates ten 
years ago, countries that were used for whatever reason to have an 
important public deficit have been trapped in a vicious circle in which the 
deficit generates an increase of the debt, hence an increase in its interest 
cost, which makes the deficit worse and so on. A drastic budgetary aus­
terity is then required in order to break the circle. We must therefore 
conclude that the public debt problem of some EEC countries is not an 




























































































on this process; this constraint will play an important role in what I have 
to say in section 4.
2. How homogeneous ought the Community to be?
In order to manage the transition well one clearly needs some idea about 
the degree of homogeneity required within the Community at some useful 
future horizon. This consideration applies in many fields. I already intro­
duced it when speaking about the organization of labor markets, conclud­
ing then that trying quickly to achieve homogeneity in labor laws and 
regulations would probably be unwise. Let us look at it now in broader 
terms, but from the particular viewpoint of macroeconomic policies.
I suggest that two facts ought to be taken for granted. Firstly labor 
mobility from one country to another will be hampered by linguistic and 
cultural differences; it will remain low unless there are strong economic 
incentives, which seems unlikely considering the degree of equalization 
already achieved in levels of living. Secondly national specificities in the 
evolution of macroeconomic conditions will remain frequent. This is not 
only because the same exogenous changes will have somewhat different 
impacts, in the same way that oil shocks did not affect the terms of trade 
of the various European countries to the same extent. It is more because, 
for a long time to come, the nation will remain the main point of 
reference for political and social life. Elections will not be synchronized; 
changes of government will at times go in opposite directions; great 
strikes will be national; even movements of public opinion imposing a 
policy change will often be peculiar to one country. All these factors will 
induce differences in the behavior and reactions of the authorities, as well 
as different changes in laws and regulations.
This prospect should not dishearten the efforts now made toward 
harmonization and policy coordination. Many of our present institutional 
disparities are the result of historical accident rather than logical 
necessity; we must fight for the elimination of those that most damage the 
process of European unification. But selectivity itself will increase the 
chances of overcoming either pure administrative resistance, which is 
frequent, or the interests of pressure groups that have not to be protected, 
or even sometimes the difficulties coming from legitimate claims that 
must somehow be taken into account. In order to guide this selectivity we 
must determine where the most urgent needs are.
Economic principles prompt us to say that a public intervention, being 
justified by some market failure, should be managed at the lowest level 
permitting correction of the failure, because at this level information is 
more complete than at higher levels and local specificities can be better 
taken into account. On the basis of this principle it has been argued that 
harmonization and policy coordination are not required at the Community 




























































































been proved. But the argument, certainly valid in some particular fields, 
often looks unrealistic and useless when it is presented as a general guide.
Consider for instance what is happening for the harmonization of 
technical norms on industrial products. It seems to be agreed that the 
existence of national differences has no positive justification and is an 
important trade barrier. But removing these differences, while each 
country’s interest is to see its norms adopted elsewhere, appeared so 
laborious and painful that the Commission first proposed a general 
principle of mutual recognition (if at the end of 1992 no harmonization 
has yet been reached for a particular kind of product, then a product 
satisfying the norms of a country would have to be automatically recog­
nized as satisfying the norms of any other country). It was realized subse­
quently that, if this was admitted, countries with the most tolerant norms 
would have a strong incentive to block any attempt at harmonization. This 
is why the text of the Single Act now stipulates that the Council of Minis­
ters will be entitled to decide after 1992 that mutual recognition will ap­
ply for particular kinds of products. How this part of the text will be 
applied remains to be seen (see J. De Ruyt, 1989). In this case it seems 
that the most urgent need for harmonization is in products whose trade is 
effectively most restricted as a consequence of technical norms; these 
products are also likely to be the ones for which the conflict of interests 
in harmonization negotiations will be the most acute, hence also perhaps 
the most effective in preventing agreement.
In the macroeconomic field, projects of a monetary union have for 
twenty years been the occasion for a standing political debate concerning 
priorities. The debate opposed “monetarists”, pleading for a fast monetary 
unification, and “economists”, arguing that this was bound to fail without 
prior efforts to promote convergence of national economies, or even 
without a significant transfer of other functions and powers to Commu­
nity level, as well as a substantial transfer of resources (see P. Ludlow, 
1982). The decisions taken after the Delors report seem to have accepted 
the move long proposed by the so-called monetarists. Perhaps because the 
terms of the political debate were not precise enough macroeconomic 
research as far as I know does not seem to have much addressed the issue 
while it was pending,. We shall see in a moment how the more specific 
questions now posed by monetary unification can be more precisely 
approached and are indeed approached.
Turning my attention now to the degree of homogeneity that ought to 
be aimed at in public budgets, I can appeal to the authority of Sir Roy 
Jenkins who gave the first Jean Monnet lecture at the Institute in October 
1977 while he was President of the Commission. He explained in particu­
lar that the monetary union, for which he was then pleading, would leave 
the public procurement of goods and services “primarily in national, re­
gional and other hands”. Indeed, from the Community point of view most 
public goods can be said to be “local”. We may think for instance of edu­




























































































tion of diplomas and measures inducing a higher mobility of students and 
teachers.
Questions of taxation are more delicate. On the one hand different sys­
tems for the provision of public services imply different modes of financ­
ing. On the other hand differences in fiscal rules may distort economic 
incentives and lead to inefficiency in economic operations, since they may 
stimulate uneconomical flow of goods, capital, or even people.
In principle there is a solution to the dilemma, namely that people be 
taxed according to their place of residence, which also gives them the 
right and the access to public services. For the taxation of goods and 
services bought by consumers the place of purchase would obtain more or 
less the same result. This rule could avoid distortions even if people 
moved easily; it would only require that the most cost effective choice of 
location for each individual precisely reflected the socially most cost 
effective for him, considering what his tastes and needs for public ser­
vices were; the approximate fulfilment of the condition would require 
some harmonization of taxation schedules, but not harmonization of tax 
rates; the condition may not even be important in practice as long as 
human mobility across countries remains low.
The rule of taxation according to residence may, however, tend to be 
used less systematically than it has been up to now. Liberalization of 
capital flows now means that a significant part of capital incomes is taxed 
where it is earned; actually in a number of countries rates of taxation on 
some capital incomes and capital gains have recently been lowered, 
mainly because it was sought to avoid capital flight abroad where taxes 
are light or even non-existent. The danger resulting from this trend has 
been pointed out by A. Giovannini (1989), who argued in favor of 
restoring the residence principle for capital taxation, notwithstanding se­
rious practical difficulties. Similarly in its White Paper on the internal 
market the Commission has elaborated a reform of the Value Added Tax 
that would avoid declaration at the internal borders and would amount to 
applying the rate of the place of production, possibilities of distortion 
being then removed by harmonization of the VAT rates. But this harmo­
nization faces serious national resistance and will be very incomplete by 
1993; in fact, concerned by the problem, the Council of Ministers has re­
cently asked the Commission to reconsider its project. We may therefore 
consider the issue as still open. A clear position taken by the economists 
would be welcome, since the matter obviously belongs to their field of 
competence: will VAT rates be sufficiently harmonized by 1993 to make 
distortions negligible in any case, or would the lack of full harmonization 
recommend a particular taxation rule?
3. Nexus of the monetary union problematics
The present policy line aims at a quick achievement of monetary union 




























































































among the eight countries now belonging to the European Monetary 
System, then as quickly as possible among all Community countries. The 
resistance of those who were called “the economists” has been overcome, 
since convergence of national economies is still far from complete, as we 
saw in the first section, not to speak of the significant transfers of power 
and resources at the Community level, which were often said to be 
required. How then should we now analyze the evolution, as we are 
engaged into it?
The main problem to be addressed follows from the lack of long run 
compatibility between three characteristics of the situation in which we 
shall soon find ourselves: fixed exchange rates (except for fluctuations 
within a narrow band), elimination of all controls on capital movements, 
and substantial differences in inflation rates. We know that at least one of 
these characteristics will have to give away.
A number of officials and politicians of the countries experiencing the 
highest inflation rates welcome the difficulty because they think that 
economic agents at home need to learn the discipline of price stability and 
that precisely this discipline will be imposed by the monetary union. It 
seems to me that a large majority of economists would not have recom­
mended such a strategy. Certainly economists as a rule like neither capital 
controls nor inflation. For a time after the fall of the Bretton Woods sys­
tem it was fashionable in the profession to praise the virtues of a system 
of fully flexible exchange rates; but this is no longer so, and in any case 
European unity is understood to mean fixed exchange rates between na­
tional currencies sooner or later, if not a single currency. Economists’ 
lack of enthusiasm for the policy announced seems to be explained by the 
belief that it will not be applied for very long. Either capital controls will 
be reintroduced in the inflation prone countries, or changes of parity will 
occur, perhaps both. Changes of parities would not be a great problem if 
they could be managed in good order. But this would require a different 
policy line.
Before wondering why most economists believe the disciplining policy 
will not be long applied, let us see what could be a policy of managed 
parities. The difficulty of EMS with full capital liberalization is how to 
make the system able to resist speculative attacks. The only way is to 
make the probability of success of the attack small: as soon as there is a 
substantial probability in the near future of getting a capital gain because 
of a significant change of parity the incentive to capital flight from the 
currency expected to be devaluated can be counteracted only by a large 
difference in interest rates. The alternative for the monetary authorities 
of the country under attack is to sell their reserves of international 
moneys; but even this may not be open because of the size of the capital 
flight, a size that is limited only by the extent of risk aversion since with 
full capital liberalization the financial system can transfer from one 




























































































calculations show that the interest rate differential may have to be so large 
that it obviously appears as unsustainable.
The European Monetary System allows realignments of central parities 
around which actual exchange rates can freely fluctuate. In principle it 
thus permits a regular drift of one currency with respect to another. For 
instance, in order to achieve an annual devaluation of 4 per cent of say the 
lira with respect to the mark one realignment every year suffices when 
the lira and die mark are close to the limits of the band at opposite sides. 
Without any change of the actual exchange rates the two currencies, after 
the realignment, will have exchanged their positions within the band 
(since the band is 2.5 per cent wide, this is possible with a maximum 
realignment of 5 per cent). With the present differences of inflation rates 
within EMS, realignments occurring about every year would permit 
stability of real exchange rates without causing the discrete changes in 
parities and the capital gains whose prospect feeds speculation. Some 
economists have indeed proposed a policy of fairly frequent though small 
realignments that would leave some role to the exchange market, but it is 
a tightly controlled role since monetary authorities would only make 
those realignments that are consistent with fundamental economic trends 
(see in particular C. Bean et al., 1990).
This policy would have the advantage of being long sustainable during a 
phase of economic convergence; it ought not of course to dispense with 
national disinflationary efforts; its difficulty comes from the fact that it is 
politically unpleasant to have to decide a realignment when it appears to 
be easily postponable. Economists preferring this policy to the one that 
presently seems to be followed , in which realignments are not on the 
agenda, fear that realignments will finally have to occur, under the pres­
sure of speculation, to be large therefore and interpreted as steps back­
ward in the process of monetary unification. Knowing the versatility of 
political opinion about economic matters, these economists also fear then 
that unification will then again appear to some as being unfeasible.
I have not explained why many believe that the disciplining policy will 
be given up before having reached its objective, namely the convergence 
of inflation rates. It is simply because the policy would appear too 
painful. In inflation prone countries this policy would be quite depressing 
because the absence of devaluation while prices are increasing faster than 
elsewhere means a real appreciation, hence a loss of competitiveness, 
which would lower the demand from abroad and divert abroad part of 
domestic demand. In order to regain the same real parity as it now has, 
such a country would first have to decrease its inflation rate to the aver­
age level, during which phase real appreciation would continue, and then 
have a lower inflation than others for a good deal of time after. This 
bulge of real overevaluation would mean unemployment and low invest­
ment, the latter implying that the loss of market shares will be felt even 
longer in the future than overevaluation will last. Expecting the policy to 




























































































completion, notwithstanding speculative attacks on the currency, loss of 
reserves and protests against poor domestic conditions, appears to many 
economists as unwarranted.
However, F. Giavazzi and L. Spaventa (1990) now present an argument 
that may be read as a justification for a policy of credible commitment to 
fixed exchange rates. More precisely they oppose this policy to a crawling 
peg policy as in the “old” EMS, or as proposed by C. Bean et al. (1990). 
The basic assumption is that the rate of inflation varies as a function of 
the deviation of output from a given trend, in which unemployment 
would be constant (at the level of the so called NAIRU). The differences 
between the two policy regimes are: (i) a real appreciation of the cur­
rency against a constant real exchange rate; (ii) the expectation of no 
change in nominal parities against that of parities adjusting to comparative 
price levels, (iii) the possibility in the first regime but not in the second to 
borrow abroad at a small real cost (this cost is equal to the difference 
between the nominal interest rate abroad and the rate of inflation at home, 
since the loans would be paid back at the same nominal exchange rate). 
When the new regime is introduced, it has an expansionary effect due to 
the lowering of the real cost of borrowing. But as real appreciation of the 
currency first accelerates then keeps increasing for some time the effect 
of the loss of competitiveness on output becomes bigger and bigger; 
eventually it dominates the effect of a low real interest rate. Except for 
the reduction in import prices, the policy thus accelerates inflation at the 
beginning (a fact that the authors claim to already witness in Italy and 
Spain); in so doing it gives more fuel to the disinflationary impact gener­
ated by the loss of competitiveness. After a time disinflation becomes 
more energetic than it would otherwise have been; it turns out that the 
inflation rate reaches the mean level in the Community sooner and that 
the eventual output loss is smaller; but the foreign debt is of course 
higher.
The argument is interesting and deserves thorough discussion. It ne­
glects two considerations that lead to effects of opposite signs. On the one 
hand, the depressing effect of appreciation on investment and on the 
growth of productive capacity reduces the excess supply of goods; a 
higher unemployment then becomes necessary to obtain the same speed of 
disinflation. On the other hand, a credible commitment to a fixed ex­
change rate may play an important direct moderating role in price and 
wage formation, thus becoming an element of the price and incomes pol­
icy: social partners and firms can no longer expect accommodating 
changes of parities that would allow them to stand against foreign com­
petition. This last argument has certainly been predominant in the policy 
lines that such French ministers as R. Barre, J. Delors and P. Bérégovoy 
have tried and are trying to follow. I suppose its place in political think­
ing is not limited to my own country.
Will EMS be able to dispense with realignments in the years to come? 




























































































ances concerning foreign accounts as well as inflation rates, but one also 
needs to bear in mind the determination of some of our political 
authorities. The French case has led me to become less sceptical about a 
positive answer than I was until recently; such an answer remains, 
however, a serious wager.
4. Macroeconomic policy coordination
For many more years to come we shall have powerful national govern­
ments. Although tightly constrained in their own monetary policies, they 
will contribute to the definition of the common monetary policy. More­
over, they will still have a large degree of freedom in budgetary matters, 
for their public expenditures, and for a number of taxes, even within 
margins for the rates to be applied to taxes like the Value Added Tax. 
National governments will then have macroeconomic policies. But in 
order for those to be successful, coordination and even collaboration 
within the Community will be necessary. This collaboration will, of 
course, have to take into account national specificities in the evolution of 
macroeconomic conditions, specificities that will remain frequent for 
reasons I mentioned at the beginning of section 2.
Ideally the formulation of macroeconomic policies within the 
Community should proceed in two stages. At the first stage common 
objectives must be agreed at the Community level. At the second stage the 
role of individual countries must be defined. Without full unification such 
a two stage procedure is unavoidable. No country should resent the fact 
that, when the second stage comes, its policies are discussed collectively 
and may be found wanting. Moreover a country that would impose on 
others, as an unwelcome constraint, a policy of its own independent 
choice would suffer a loss of political goodwill; its weight in the political 
process of European unification would be damaged, which would not be 
in its interest. Thus there would have to be collective examinations in 
which the views of national governments would of course differ 
somewhat and compromises would have to be found. Efficient response to 
shocks would also require that such examinations be frequently repeated.
This is not the place to discuss what the general stance of the Commu­
nity macroeconomic policy ought to be now. We note with satisfaction 
that the rate of utilization of capacities is high, that investments are 
booming and that unemployment is decreasing, whereas in most countries 
inflationary pressures are well contained. Some commentators even speak 
of the end of Eurosclerosis. Thus no change of the common policy line is 
required at this time. But present conditions cannot be expected to last 
indefinitely. One day or another macroeconomic policy will have to be 
reoriented.
More important is to know the principles that should inspire the 




























































































economic situations be taken into account in order to define national 
macroeconomic policies?
The usual macroeconomic principles will of course apply. But these 
were determined from theoretical analyses that often focused on the case 
of a closed economy, whereas any country in the Community is already 
very much an open economy and will increasingly be so. These principles 
tell us that, when for instance demand stimulation is required at the 
Community level, this should be done preferably where unemployment is 
particularly high and increasing particularly fast, or decreasing particu­
larly slowly, where idle capacity margins are particularly important, and 
where inflation is particularly low. These principles do not have to be 
forgotten, but they should be given less weight than was formerly the 
case, since demand stimulation will largely spill over to other countries.
Considering the present imbalance in the respective situations of the 
accounts of foreign payments of the various European countries, we can 
be sure that it has to be reflected in the principles. One natural rule is to 
say that demand stimulation when required should preferably come from 
countries with a large current account surplus, whereas demand 
contraction should come from countries with a large foreign deficit. But 
should not the principle be formulated somewhat differently? Similarly, 
since fiscal policy is going to be the main instrument for the macroeco­
nomic actions of national governments, public sector deficits ought to be 
considered: one can hardly ask countries with very large government 
deficits to increase their public expenditures and reduce their taxes. But 
here again how precisely should the principle be formulated?
The two questions above have been recently examined by several au­
thors, in particular in J. Draze et al. (1987) who considered the problems 
of macroeconomic policy as they appeared in 1986. They pointed out that 
deficits may not be the most relevant indicators, since debts seem to be 
more significant. Deficits may matter only to the extent that they provide 
measures of variation in debts. But those are quite imperfect measures. If 
the concern is, let us say, for the ratio of public sector debt to GDP, then 
the change in this ratio is equal to the difference between the rate of pub­
lic deficit to GDP, as normally considered, and the rate of growth of 
nominal GDP multiplied by the ratio of debt to GDP; since inflation rates 
vary greatly between countries, so does the GDP nominal growth rate. 
Considering the ratios of the foreign debt and the public debt to GDP, as 
well as the current trends in their variations, seems to provide the correct 
reference.
But even this conclusion may not be good, since some countries and 
perhaps also some public sectors may be living through an investment 
phase that will bring high returns later on, while other countries or public 
sectors may at the same time be in a wholly different situation. It would 
be natural for the former to borrow and to accept an increase in their 
debts, while the latter ought rather to redeem some of their debts. In 




























































































rather than the ratio of debt to GDP. However, solvency is not easily 
measurable and may be subject to abrupt changes, as the case of Brazil ten 
years ago reminds us. The sensible conclusion therefore is to use as a ref­
erence the ratio in question, but not blindly. In any case present dispari­
ties in indebtedness are such that corrections intended to permit a better 
evaluation of solvency would have little impact on the relative positions of 
the various European countries.
It is clear then that countries with large public debts ought to have re­
strictive budgetary policies. For the Community as a whole as well as for 
themselves, it would be appropriate that restrictions be particularly severe 
at times of booms in business conditions, when the risk of inflationary 
pressures is the most serious. Conversely, countries with low public debts 
are naturally called to have stimulating budgetary policies at times of 
slack. This simple principle will have a large role to play for many years, 
considering the nature of the present disparities. The more traditional 
ones listed previously are of course not to be overlooked; but their weight 
will, as I said, be smaller than it used to be.
During these four lectures I have covered a wide range of questions, 
too wide a range for me to have been able to avoid a number of over­
simplifications, as well as the neglect of many scientific works, even 
among the most interesting ones dealing with the main issues. I have 
wanted to present an overview of what I believe I have to say at this time 
about the contributions that the discipline of macroeconomics can bring to 
the solution of problems now raised by the choice of European economic 
policies and about some important research topics, the outcome of which 
could enlighten aspects of this choice.
My message claims no originality, but would, I am afraid, be disputed 
in several of its main points by some of my colleagues. I hope that it will 
be found at least worth discussing by people who are, in one way or 
another, concerned by the subject.
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